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The scope of the paper is to estimate post-program effects in fostering good transitions from unemployment 
to work. Such an issue implies that besides job finding rates, qualitative variables related to work have to be 
included as well. The evaluation is based on a comprehensive transversal dataset of Danes who ended an 
activation program in the year 2002, merged with individuals’ profile and retrospective yearly information 
related to their socioeconomic status, extent of working time and wage level. The control of unobserved 
heterogeneity and  post-program  effects are  investigated  through  treatment-effects  models.  As  regards 
transitions to  work and  full-time job,  main  results  show fairly  large  positive  effects  for  private  sector 
employment  programs.  Smaller  positive  impacts  are  found  for  labour  market  training  and 
services/sanctions, whereas negative coefficients are assigned to public sector employment programs. All 
things being equal, the large positive coefficient of the private sector employment programs’ category is the 
result of its closer link with the “ordinary” labour market which provides “contact effects”. It is worthwhile 
that job opportunities for private sector employment participants are highly dependent on the business cycle. 
Besides,  this  type  of  programss  are  submitted  to  “creaming effects”  as  unemployed with longer  work 
experience benefit the most from the private sector. The best way to cope with labour shortage is education 
and training whereas the reduction of public expenditure can be achieved through sanctions programs. The 
“work first” strategy of this last category of programs is more profitable for the unemployed who benefit 
from social  network.  Such  a  situation  leads  to  “dead-weight  effects”  thus  making  public  intervention 
unnecessary. Long-term effects on wages are the most positive for those who where involved into labour 
market training programs because off  the higher return to education in line with human capital  theory. 
Services/sanctions also get fairly positive coefficients for the wage level. Coefficients are not statistically 
significant for  private sector employment  programs and are negative for  public sector  employment.  As 
suggested by previous studies, subsidised programs can indeed be perceived by employers as to be a signal 
of lower-than-average productivity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
ince the well  known Rehn-Meidner model (developed in Sweden 1940-1960) 
which  goes  beyond  the  traditional  keynesian  and  monetarist  approaches  by 
encompassing core features such as a restrictive fiscal policy,  a “solidaristic” 
wage policy and an active labour market, ALMPs have rather stand the test of time. In 
the fight against the marginalisation process, ALMPs whose aims are to maintain (or 
even  increase)  unemployed  skills  and  overcome  structural  imbalances  in  the  labour 
market  by  a  better  adjustment  of  labour  supply  to  demand (Calmfors  & Skedinger, 
1995) have been widely used throughout the European Union (EU) and to a slight extent 
in the  United  States  (US).  ALMPs belong to  the group of  supply  side  policies  and 
proactive  measures  that  have  been  widely  used  throughout  the  European  Union  to 
enhance employability,  equity and growth while preventing long-term unemployment 
for those at risk in a more and more open economy. With the Luxembourg European 
Council meeting (20 and 21 November 1997) and the Treaty of Amsterdam’s title on 
employment it was decided that “employment guidelines” and multilateral monitoring of 
economic policies are ways of success through accelerating convergence towards the 
best performance while being respectful of the subsidiarity principle1. Taken over by EU 
(European Union) policies, it is used as an instrument for determining when the Union is 
allowed to act, and, in any federal system, to regulate material division of power2. To 
cope with this new form of European governance, the employment guidelines reviewed 
in  the  European  Employment  Strategy  result  in  National  Employment  Action  Plans 
(NAPs). ALMPs effort is listed among the current employment guidelines and deserves 
particular attention from the European policy makers and international observers. Even 
though  different  activation  strategies  have  prevailed  in  Scandinavia  since  years, 
Denmark becomes the front-runner in this field because of the wide-ranging reforms 
implemented during the 1990s. A renewed interest in the Danish ALMPs may emerge 
among scholars interested in issues related to Transitional Labour Markets because of  i) 
the  role  played  by  employment  policies  to  manage  the  process  of  job  creation  and 
destruction  ii)  the  emphasis  on  employment  security  rather  than  on  job  security3 to 
counterpart  the  “externalisation”  of  work  careers  implied  by  the  erosion  of  internal 
labour  markets  in  “post-fordist”  economies,  iii)  the  central  part  played  by  “social 
citizenship” in reforming the activation strategy, iv) the way these policies  have been 
negotiated and co-financed by employees and employers.
S
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1. Subsidiarity must be understood as the principle according to which the next upper authority should have 
a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at the current or 
any lower level.
2. Constitutionalists distinguish a formal division of powers, the liberal one, according to the “form” of 
legal texts (acts, regulations,…) and a material division of powers, the federal one according to the ‘matter” 
of decision (foreign policy, health, education…) 
3. “Job security” aims at granting the continuation of the same job and thus does not imply any reallocation 
of work. This component of security is highly dependent of the different national employment protection 
legislation. “Employment security” main purpose is to enhance employability of the workforce to favour 
both transitions from unemployment to employment and between jobs. This component of security comes 
with a reallocation of the workforce and is more often linked to ALMPs and educational policies.
Besides, Denmark is often seen as a textbook case of how to better manage transitions 
between unemployment and employment because of the range of opportunities provided 
by public schemes which include not  only “transitional  employment”  but  also more 
active lines such as incentives and upgrading skills. 
ALMPs’ effects can be regarded as twofold: in a macroeconomic perspective they 
should  theoretically  improve  the  unemployment-inflation  trade-off  by  lowering  the 
unemployment rate while avoiding supply bottlenecks in the labour market. 
In a microeconomic perspective, they are supposed to reduce the unemployment spell 
and thus increase job finding rates via human capital improvement. To sum things up, 
what stand out from the literature is that even though positive effects can be expected 
from ALMPs they  appear  to  be  rather  small  and  not  that  much  cost-effective  with 
sometimes adverse effects. 
Nevertheless, only a limited number of evaluations have been carried out with respect to 
long-term effects of participation in programs on wages and type of working contracts. 
This  article  tries  to  fill  the  gap  by  carrying  out  an  empirical  analysis  based  on 
administrative register data from Denmark Statistics. According to current labour market 
policies  orientations  in  Denmark,  two new categories  will  be  distinguished  as  well: 
services and sanctions and immigrant education programs. 
Section two addresses the topical issue of the institutional determinants of ALMPs 
development before  to move into the adjustment  and changes  in the Danish “active 
line”. Then the section presents the reader an overview of the microeconomic literature 
about  ALMPs.  The purpose of  this  brief  excursion into these  empirical  works  is  to 
provide a comprehensive and useful framework to conduct further analyses in a field 
which constitutes one of the main controversial subjects in labour economics. Section 
three gives explanations of the different administrative records used to make the dataset, 
the variables and the way they have been codified to suit the analysis. This section also 
provides  an  evaluation of  the determinants  of  program participation through logistic 
regressions. The fourth and fifth sections are designed for the empirical analysis about 
individual  trajectories.  Based  on  a  large  micro  dataset,  the  aim  will  be  to  tackle 
evidences as regards to ii) transitions to work, ii) individual earnings and iii) extent of 
working  time  while  controlling  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics.  To  do  so, 
treatment effects and multinomial logit models will be implemented. 
2. THE STAKES OF ALMPs IN DENMARK
2.1 ALMPs and employment security in the “flexicurity triangle”
Today  Denmark  is  the  country  with  the  highest  spending  both  on  active 
expenditures (1,52 as a % of GDP, Eurostat 2004) and passive expenditures (2,67 as a % 
of GDP,  Eurostat 2004). It  is rather misleading to separate the active part  from the 
passive one because they are as one in the Scandinavian activation strategy. In Denmark 
these two labour market policies expenditures are fully integrated in the well known 
“flexicurity” triangle  based on social  compromise4.  In short,  the first  angle  refers to 
labour market flexibility with high job mobility and a permissive legislation as regards 
job protection.  The  second angle  refers  to  the  generous  welfare  schemes  with  high 
perceived  job  security  and  high  income  security  (high  compensation  rate  and  long 
benefit  duration).  Labour  market  dynamics  and  income  security  form  the  basic 
flexicurity nexus. ALMPs which represents the third angle encompass elements of both 
social  disciplining  (incentives  to  take  and  seek  jobs)  and  social  integration 
(competencies  and qualifications  to achieve a  job) according to the “right-and-duty” 
principle (Graversen & van Ours, 2005).
Concerning the functioning of the flexicurity triangle, ALMPs should ensure the 
junction between the two first angles. ALMPs remain one of the main spearheads for 
countries,  such  as  Denmark,  whose  “flexicurity  regimes”  are  based  on  the  external 
security /external flexibility nexus (Bredgaard & al., 2007 (2)). The external numerical 
flexibility (i.e. high job transitions, low job security) is indeed offset by employment 
security with a reallocation of work (i.e. ALMPs, educational policies) undertaken by 
the  state.  Such  configuration  allows  firms  to  adjust  more  freely  to  market  changes 
compared  to  the  internal  flexibility/internal  security  nexus  which  bears  upon firms’ 
responsibility as regards job security. This conception of the Danish labour market based 
on the external security/external flexibility nexus is somewhat restrictive but sufficient 
to legitimate ALMPs in the functioning of the flexicurity triangle. Evaluations based on 
companies’ level  data  can  bring  to  the  fore  new  insights  about  human  resources 
strategies and flexicurity (Blache & al., 2008). Some companies, in line with the core-
periphery  model  (Atkinson,  1984))  can  score  high  on  both  internal  and  external 
flexibility  parameters  with  their  employees.  We  should  acknowledge  that  the 
development of ALMPs in the 90’ happened in a period of strong economic upswing 
which speeded up the  fall  in  unemployment.  Often  left  in  abeyance,  the  significant 
decline in unemployment through a very short length of time has only been possible by 
overcoming economics circumstances that is the macroeconomic context. It required a 
great deal of precision as regards timing and coordination between macroeconomic and 
structural policies to avoid overheating (Blache, 2007 (1)).
_______________________________________
4. See P.K.Madsen, 2005 for further details about the “flexicurity” model, T.Bredgaard & al., 2007 (1) for a 
disaggregate study of the flexicurity model.
Figure 1 shows that the increase of GDP growth is positively correlated with the fall in 
unemployment. Besides, the trend as regards job creation is quite sensitive to the GDP 
growth  trend.  The  likelihood  of  transition  from  unemployment  to  employment  is 
strongly pro-cyclical, that is when the GDP growth steps up the probability of finding 
job raises (Westergard, 2001). In fact, the GDP growth and the unemployment rate are 
jointly determined by the process of job creation and destruction (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 
2006). Indeed, the way this process is managed by countries provides some explanations 
on the growth levels as well as on the unemployment levels in Europe. In that respect, 
Denmark benefits from a very reactive labour market organization with great emphasis 
put  on  workforce  mobility,  employment  policies  and  free  choices  of  firms.  ALMPs 
played an important role in ensuring a trade-off between inflation and unemployment by 
maintaining the size of the labour force in  times of recessions during the 1990s while 
avoiding bottlenecks  once the economic upswing was under way (see  Layard & al. 
(1991) for theoretical assumptions).
Figure 1.  The GDP growth – employment nexus
In the Danish flexicurity, the purpose of ALMPs in a more microeconomic perspective is 
twofold:  i)  activation  aims  at  guaranteeing  an  incentive  for  job  search  in  the 
unemployment insurance system. Just before the unemployment benefit period run out, 
unemployed lower their  reservation wage and increase  their  job when they  consider 
activation negatively in a perfect foresight model.  This effect  is better known as the 
threat  effect or  motivational  effect of  ALMPs (Geerdsen,  2002;  Rosholm & Svarer, 
2004). ii) Activation may display a qualification effect by enhancing the employability 
of unemployed and thus, improve their likelihood in finding a new job. ALMPs are a 
key element in the flexicurity for workforce development. Ongoing research about the 
Danish  flexicurity  model  also  refers  to  lifelong  learning  as  a  crucial  linchpin  with 
ALMPs to maintain employment security and to cope with structural changes. 
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One of the main reasons for ALMPs longevity in Denmark comes from the tripartite 
negotiation between the government, national employer’s associations and trade unions. 
The  backing  support  of  employers  has  been  considered  as  a  crucial  linchpin  in 
explaining the Danish success as regards to ALMPs developments (Martin & Swank, 
2004; Martin, 2004). For the authors,  the organization of business matters for social 
policy  development  and  therefore  as  regards  ALMPs  spending  effort.  The  more 
important is the degree of corporatism in employers’ organizations, the more important 
is  ALMPs spending  at  the  national  level.  The  reason  is  that  centralized  employers’ 
organizations, encompassing groups are more likely to go beyond particular interest by 
focusing on collective concerns of their membership (Martin & Swank, 2004).
The  partisanship  model  from  D.Rueda  (2006)  shows  that  contrary  to  spread  ideas 
according  to  which  higher  levels  of  ALMPs  are  assigned  to  social-democratic 
governments, the insider-outsider politics do matter the most. The argument starts from 
the social democratic parties’ dilemma because they have to cope both with  outsiders 
demand for ALMPs and the fear from insiders as regards to the policies effects on taxes. 
Therefore,  insiders are being usually more unionized so that social-democratic parties 
should  reduce  ALMPs efforts.  Indeed,  what  makes  them to  invest  more  in  ALMPs 
comes from the closer interests of insiders and outsiders, and upstream, the decrease of 
employment  protection  and  the  instability  of  the  unemployment  rate.  Therefore,  the 
increasing  vulnerability  of  insiders to  unemployment  makes  them  put  pressure  on 
governments  to  promote  employment  policies  via  collective  bargaining.  Several 
examples throughout the European Union show that the impulsion comes from insiders 
vulnerability  vis-à-vis  employment  protection  and  not  at  all  from  the  nature  of 
government in itself (i.e.1 “New Deal” and life long learning at the end of the 1990s in 
Britain, i.e.2 in Sweden ALMPs spending has been at its highest in the early 1990s when 
government was conservative, i.e.3 In Denmark, even though the labour market reform 
has  been  implemented  by  a  social  democratic  government,  the  actual  liberal 
conservative government has been in continuation of the active line in the 1990s (see 
figure 2.) with even more spending on active expenditures and less on passive ones).
Figure 2. The enrolment into activation programs. Data source: Statistics Denmark
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2.2 From economic compensation rights to economic participation rights
Since  the  labour  market  reform in  1994,  several  changes  have  been  made  as 
regards  to  the unemployment  insurance/ALMPs nexus  leading  to a  new equilibrium 
between  re-commodification and  decommodification5. Activation reforms in the 1990s 
are to be found in the redistributive conflicts and the evolution of the social citizenship 
concept which has been recast through a re-negotiation of a right to participation and the 
obligations associated with social rights (Kvist, 2003). 
The underlying objectives of the reform were to i) improve the employment prospects of 
the unemployed by strengthening ALMPs programs, ii) reduce  moral hazard through 
greater incentives, iii) to figure out activation as a counterpart to legitimate generous 
unemployment  benefits  (maximum replacement  rate  of  90% of the previous  income 
with ceiling).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the unemployed could renew their eligibility for 
benefits each time they achieve their participation into one of the activation programs. 
In 1994, the reform put an end to this rule; the unemployed who have exhausted 
their unemployment benefit period and did not find a job rely on social assistance and 
have to follow an active social program (ASP) to reduce the length of welfare spells. 
With the reform,  claimant’s  obligations  are  reflected by a  shortening in his  benefits 
period, tougher sanctions and to a slight extent cuts in benefit levels.
Since 1994, the benefit period was divided into two periods. The first 4-year period, was 
called the contact period (or passive period) during which the unemployed might search 
for a job or participate in an activation program. During the second period, a 3-year one, 
which was called the activation period, the unemployed had the right and the obligation 
to accept  activation  offers  (75% of  his  time).  The start  of  the activation  period  has 
gradually been put forward then; since July 1996, the contact period was reduced from 4 
to 3  years,  then  from 3 years  to 2  after  January 1998.  Eligibility  to  unemployment 
insurance required at least 12 months (initially 6 months before June 1996) membership 
in an unemployment insurance fund (taking over by unions) and 12 months employment 
during the last 3 years. Since 1994, claimants can be excluded for their second refusal 
job, or second activation offer. Note that such an orientation in Denmark did not provide 
high risks of displacement among unemployed because of the high arrival rate of job 
offers  (Albæk  &  al.,  2002)  and the  effectiveness  of  its  profiling  system.  Tighter 
obligations have also been set up as regards mobility requirements, both occupational 
and  geographical.  Since  2000,  the  activation  period starts  after  one  year  of 
unemployment spell. During these successive changes, the  activation period duration 
remained constant. Finally, from 2002 onwards, the distinction between the two periods 
was abolished, and unemployed are indeed required to accept activation offers at any 
time during their unemployment spell.
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5. Re-commodification refers to the ability with which individuals can enter or re-enter the labour market. 
The process is usually attributed to ALMPs.  Decommodification  refers to the more or less dependency 
towards the market. 
If  activation  is  still  a  priority  in  Denmark  as  regards  the  high level  of  ALMPs 
expenditures, new orientations have been conducted by the present liberal-conservative 
government (Venstre og Konservative). Since the 2002 reform “more people to work”, 
unemployment  policy  in  favour  of  work  incentives  (i.e.  tax  deduction)  with  more 
emphasis on social welfare recipients (i.e. ceiling on social assistance deposits) became 
more  relevant.  Besides,  efforts  have  been  done  in  immigration/integration  policies 
through various programs such as “new law on immigration” (2002) and “a new chance 
for all” (2005) which mainly consist of a tighter follow-up and stronger obligations for 
this target group. In short, because of the relative low level of structural unemployment 
and the persistence of social exclusion (about one quarter of the population depend on 
welfare  scheme  and  are  therefore  outside  the  labour  market),  policy  priorities  and 
targeting groups have changed. Raising labour supply is a crucial linchpin to safeguard 
welfare and anticipate the growing share of retired population in the future. 
For the time period use in the analysis, activation offers for insured unemployed 
were  usually  made  by  the  local  employment  agency.  The  14  local  labour  market 
councils  can decide to target  programs to specific groups when needed.  Despite the 
decentralisation  of  competence  (counties,  Amter)  in  this  field,  the  labour  market 
councils are based on corporatist principles with centrally formulated goals agreed on by 
both employers and employees. From now on, with the administrative struktural reform 
(2007)  and  the  removal  of  counties, the  implementation  of  active  labour  market 
programs is under the competence of municipalities. The government has also made a 
few  institutional  changes  as  regards  the  administrative  organisation  of  the  public 
employment system. Without going more into details, we still have to mention recent 
additional reforms such as the inclusion of private providers and the creation of a one-
string system (eng-strenget system) for more flexibility and efficiency in the monitoring 
of both unemployment benefit recipients and welfare benefit recipients.
According  to  Kluve  (2006)  ALMPs’ classification  and  the  general  context  exposed 
previously,  four heading categories of  active labour market programs and two target 
groups will be distinguished in the analysis (cf. box n°1). To cope with the high level of 
unemployment  in  the  early  1990s,  besides  the  activation  path Denmark  pursued  a 
citizen’s income path during the 1990s through various leave schemes and retirement 
labour market programs. Leave schemes will not be included in the analysis because 
they are not used any more since 2000 with the return of full employment and the risk of 
wage pressure. The reduction of early retirement schemes has also been a key objective 
by the present government and will not be included in the analysis as they maintain 
people out of the labour market.
Box n°1. A classification of active labour market programs in Denmark
* Private sector employment programs: mainly refers to subsidized as  private job 
training during  which  the  unemployed  is  offered  an  employment  with  a  private 
employer. By recruiting the unemployed in a job which can last up to two years, a 
wage subsidy is paid to the employer for up to one year (50% of the minimum wage). 
If the period lasts more than six months, the unemployed should either be hired or 
offered a training period by the firm. The aim of private job training is to provide the 
unemployed a real work experience before to be integrated into regular employment. 
Adult  apprenticeship  support also  belongs  to  subsidized  employment  where  a 
periodic payment is offered to private employers when an unemployed is offered a 
training period within the firm. Adult apprenticeship support fits situation when there 
is a shortage of persons with a specific education within a specific area. The third 
program  who  belongs  to  the  “private  sector  employment  programs”  category  is 
labour  trainee  which  aims at  increasing  skills  through  working  into  a  private 
company  between  two  and  four  weeks  before  to  get  an  ordinary  job.  No  wage 
subsidy is paid to private employers. Therefore we choose to use a broader category 
called “private  sector employment  programs”  instead of  “private  sector  incentive 
programs”.
*Public sector employment programs: encompasses either subsidized employment or 
direct job creation both in the public sector. We can not apply here the classification 
made by J.Kluve (2006) because wage subsidies or  private job training is not an 
exclusive competence of the private sector but can be applied as well in the public 
sector  in  Denmark.  So  a  broader  category  has  been  preferred  over  the  category 
“direct  employment programs in the public sector”.  Public job training has been 
included in the category. This program is exactly the same as private job training 
described above except from the sector differentiation. Individual job training which 
provides hard-to-place unemployed a temporary job also belongs to the employment 
subsidies. The job can take place either in an association or in the public sector but 
can not take the form of an ordinary employment with a private employer. As regards 
direct job creation and temporary job in the public sector, services jobs and pool jobs 
have  also  been  integrated  in  the  “public  sector  employment  programs”  category. 
Services jobs aim at improving the employability of long-time unemployed through 
direct jobs creation in the public sector.  Pool jobs consist of temporary jobs within 
the  public  sector  while  participants  continue  to  receive  unemployment  benefit. 
Voluntary not paid activities of community interest designed for people under social 
assistance have been integrated as well in the category.
2.3 A review of the economic literature
 The evidence put forward by the literature is that individual trajectories are highly 
affected:  i)  before  participation,  by  the  threat  effect (or  pre-program  effect)  which 
significantly increases the job search activity just before participating in programs often 
perceived as being too restrictive (Black & al.,  2003;  Lalive & al.  2002), ii)  during 
participation, by the locking-in effect which reduces the job search activity owing to the 
lack of time when individuals have to complete an ongoing skill-enhancing activity, iii) 
after participation, by the post-program effect (or treatment effect), normally supposed 
to enhance employability and thus, increases the chance of getting unemployed people 
back to work (Van Ours, 2004; Richardson & Van den Berg, 2001; Lalive & al., 2002). 
* Education/training programs (or labour market training programs): consists of all 
types of classroom training and last a few months. It can take the form of various 
measures;  adult education subsidies,  education with training allowance,  specially 
adapted  educational  activities and adult  further education.  This category aims at 
enhancing unemployed employability through human capital development and take 
place  either  in  the  ordinary  education/training  system  or  in  special  tailor-made 
programs.  During  participation  in  such  programs,  the  unemployed  can  receive  a 
training allowance which corresponds to the unemployment benefit that the person 
concerned would otherwise has been entitled to. Subsidies are also given to service 
providers.
*Services and sanctions programs: as regards today labour market policy orientation 
in Denmark, it is preferable to integrate services and sanctions rather than a category 
called “other programs” which is more often too heterogeneous and does not prove 
anything. Two complementary programs are integrated into this category:  intensive 
job  seeking which  is  a  preventive  measure  based  on  vocational  guidance  and 
individual action plan, and advisory/introductory activation which include rights and 
duties for the unemployed.
* Integration programs (targeted programs): encompasses all measures focusing on 
immigrants  and  can  take  either  the  form  of  general  education  (course  in 
understanding of the society, Danish lessons and separately planned Danish lessons) 
or job search assistance (specially adapted activation).
*  Measures  for  the  disabled  (targeted  programs):  include  flex-jobs and  light-job 
programs.  Both  programs  aim  at  providing  participants  a  sheltered  work  or 
vocational rehabilitation. Employers benefit from subsidies when taking in charge 
this group of people. Flex-jobs differ from light-job measures because they can also 
be applied to help people who have difficulties in maintaining a job.
The  post-  program effects  are  measured  by  employment  probabilities,  employment 
spells and individual earnings6. Even though there is an extensive and growing empirical 
literature about ALMPs, post-program effects at the individual level constitute one of the 
main controversial issues. The content of programs, the selection process, the business 
cycle at the time of the evaluation as well as the estimating models differ across the 
studies (Raaum & al.,  2002). Nevertheless,  some evidence can be underscored from 
international  cross-country  surveys  (Heckman  & al.,  1999;  Martin  &  Grubb,  2001; 
Kluve & Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2006). 
Main results show that private employment subsidies  are associated with a higher 
probability of yielding positive  post-program effects.  Training programs are the most 
expensive and widely used active  measures  in Europe and appear  to  be positive  on 
single mothers but have rather poor effects on other vulnerable groups such as youth and 
older workers with low initial education. Job creation in the public sector provides no 
real benefits in the long-term. Besides, they convey low marginal product and are often 
seen as hiding the real level of unemployment. Regarding services and sanctions which 
are the least costly measures their effects are rather non-conclusive. The positive impact 
of job-search assistance depends on the quality of employment services and monitoring 
control. Only a few studies have been conducted about sanctions programs even though 
a  well  balanced  system including job search assistance,  claimants’ obligations  (with 
sanctions  in  case  of  default  leading  in  some  cases  to  partial  suspensions  of 
unemployment  benefits)  and  training  programs  has  proved  to  be  more  efficient. 
Concerning youth measures, they usually show a negative picture despite a few national 
successful programs when they come with wage subsidies.
Because of the extensive use of active labour programs which are particularly costly 
in Denmark, it is quite obvious that investigations had been conducted to assess  post-
program effects.  Based on fixed effect estimation, K.Langager (1997) shows that the 
effects are the most positive and significant for private job training participants, while 
being small as regards to public job training beneficiaries, and with even adverse effects 
for  those engaged into education schemes.  On the government  side,  the Ministry  of 
Social  Affairs  shows the same results  (Arbejdsministeriet,  2000).  Based  on different 
foresight expectation models as regards to the shortenings in the passive unemployment 
insurance period in the 1990s, a first breakthrough by Geerdsen (2002, 2006,) tackled 
the presence of an important threat effect prior to activation (net increase in the overall 
hazard rate after the activation plan which precedes full time participation into one of 
the compulsory activation programs). 
_______________________________________
6.  If  these  three  effects  can  obviously  induce  the  matching  process  (Edin  &  Holmlund,  1991) 
microeconomic analyses are also important as regards: i) ALMPs indirect effects on “non-treated” people 
(i.e., displacement effect when individuals in subsidised programs are hired at the expense of others due to 
relative costs changes,  deadweight effect  referring to the situation where participants beneficiaries would 
have also been hired in the absence of the program (Calmfors & al.,1995; Forslund & Krueger,  1993), 
deposit) and expectation effect in reducing welfare-loss from being out of work (Korpi, 1994, Raaum & al. 
2002), iii) windfall effects and creaming effects can be observed as regards to the selectivity of recruitment 
in ALMPs programs.
Even though  pre-program effects are beyond the scope of the paper we must keep in 
mind that when the threat effect is not included in the analysis post-program effects are 
downward biased (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). Nevertheless, the threat effect depicted by 
Rosholm & Svarer (2004) does not affect post-program effects in comparison between 
programs: in both situations (threat effect included or not) private sector employment 
programs have the most  positive  post-program effects on the job finding rate.  Post-
program  effects  are  close  to  zero  for  public  employment  programs  and 
education/training measures while being negative for the other programs’ category. 
With respect to the flexicurity triangle, ALMPs’ motivational effects (pre-program 
effects)  have  therefore  proved  to  be  more  effective  than  qualification  effects  (post-
program effects)  in  reducing  the  duration  of  unemployment.  Treatment  effects  have 
mainly been investigated in terms of employability and transitions to work. However, 
within  the  scope  of  the  European Employment Strategy  further  analyses  are  needed 
about ALMPs long-term effects  on qualitative  variables such as  wages, employment 
duration and extent of working time. There is little compelling evidence that ALMPs in 
Europe  have  had  a  positive  impact  on  participants’ wages  (Heckman  & al.,  1999). 
Results  stated  in  the  literature  remain  controversial  compared  to  the  effects  on 
employment probabilities. Consistent and positive effects have been found in Norway 
(Raaum & Torp, 2002). As for Denmark and Sweden results are very sensitive to the 
time period used and the methodology applied. Using fixed effects models Jensen & al. 
(1993)  find small  wage  effects  as  regards  labour  market  training  programs whereas 
Westergaard and Nielsen (1993), based on a bigger cohort of participants found positive 
impacts. As regards labour market histories, common findings show that the duration of 
subsequent  employment  spells  after  participation  increase  for  private  job  training, 
decrease for public job training while classroom training has no effect (Bonnal, 1997; 
Ham & Lalonde, 1996; Eberwin & al., 1997, Munch & Skipper, 2008).
Recent evaluations using well advanced models tried to estimate jointly the transitions 
out of unemployment, the duration of employment and the wage impacts (Gerfin & al., 
2005; Lechner & al., 2004; Munch & Skipper, 2008). Using an indicator of job quality 
(continuously employed for at least 3 months with earnings of at least 90% of those in 
the last job), Gerfin & al. (2005) find that subsidized temporary employment program is 
the most efficient ALM programs in Switzerland. Based on the same multiple treatments 
model, Lechner & al., (2004) investigate the impact of public sector sponsored training 
programs in Germany.  Negative short-term effects  and positive long-term effects  for 
most  of  the  programs  have  been  outlined  by  Lechner  &  al.,  (2004).  Based  on  an 
extended multivariate duration model, Munch & Skipper (2008) find longer spells of 
employment at the cost of a lower hourly wage rate for private and as well as ordinary 
classroom training. The effects of public job training are negative for all variables of 
interest Munch & Skipper (2008).
Our  article  contributes  to  the  international  literature  in  two  ways:  Firstly,  the 
evaluation  can  be  seen  as  a  possible  extension of  previous  research  because  of  the 
emphasis put on new qualitative variables such as the extent of working time.
Even though the main purpose of ALMPs’ is to get unemployed back to work, the extent 
of working time is an important matter if we consider the potential long-term effects of 
non-permanent work on  the quality of working life, employee’s overall labour market 
position and prospects (Gimeno & al. 2004; Scheele, 2002; Virtanen, 2006). This paper 
evaluates  the  impacts  of  ALMPs  on  the  job  finding  rates  but  also  on  qualitative 
indicators such as the extent of working time and the wage level. Besides, the use of 
transversal data will give an overview of the employment dynamics. 
Secondly, the paper sheds new lights on the effects of the programs in Denmark because 
of the methodology applied and the use of updated data. No evaluations have been runt 
on the baseline year 2002 that  is  when the passive period has  been removed.  Most 
previous studies have been conducted on longitudinal data covering the period 1995-
2000. The programs’ classification used and the inclusion of a “services and sanctions” 
category  should  also  bring  new  insights  as  regards  today  employment  policy  in 
Denmark. 
3. DATA, SELECTIVITY AND TARGETING
3.1 Data
The data used come from different administrative databases from Statistics Denmark. In 
Denmark, every resident is assigned a personal identification number (CPR), and all life 
long this number is logged in encounters with most private and public systems. Thanks 
to the existence of such a unique identification system Statistics Denmark can use it to 
create a wide spectre of merged data sets which describe the entire population. The CPR 
is tightly framed by the law and Research institutions have of course only access to an 
anonymous  version  of  it.  Everything  about  activation  enrolment  is  collected  by  the 
AMFORA (Register on Labour Market Measures). This register provides information on 
the  average  number  of  people  participating  in  labour  market  policy  programs,  and 
various variables such as: type of measure, date of commencement and cessation for the 
measure, hours per week for the measure and type of subsidy/placement. The year 2002 
has  been  chosen  as  baseline,  such  as  the  sample  includes  all  people  who  ended  a 
program in the end of November 2002. The year 2002 was preferred in order to have 
sufficient  retrospective  interviews  to  follow people  over  time.  Background variables 
(age, sex, gender...) as well as the ones about the last job (sector of industry, occupation, 
and work experience) have been taken from the IDA register (Integretet Database for 
Arbejdsmarkedsforsking). IDA contains information from various statistical registers at 
Statistics  Denmark  as  well  as  on  the  population,  the  population's  attachment  to  the 
labour market, and establishments and firms (Statistics Denmark). The variable “highest 
completed education” comes from a register called “Education and employment of the 
population” and the information on origin comes from a register called “immigrants and 
their descendants”. 
To follow people over time, the socio-economic status of individuals is another variable 
drawn from the register called RAS (Register-based Labour Force Statistics). Following 
the  guidelines  set  by  the  ILO  (International  Labour  organisation)  as  regards  the 
identified  statuses,  RAS  statistics  contains  information  on  the  Danish  population's 
attachment to the labour market at the end of November each year (Statistics Denmark). 
Based on the classification described in previous section,  a categorical variable have 
been  made  activation  programs.  Then,  all  modalities  within  the  variable  have  been 
dichotomized  in  six  dummies  (PRIVATEMP,  PUBLICEMP,  TRAINING, 
SERVSANCTIONS,  INTEGRATION  (TP),  DISABLED  (TP)).  Modalities  focusing  on 
target  groups  (immigrant  and  disabled)  have  of  course  been  dropped  out  when 
performing multi-treatment analyses. I will come back later on the models applied. A 
brief description of the sample is described in Table 1:
Table 1. Description of the sample. Baseline: end of the year 2002 
observations % val. % cum. %
Private sector employment 16018 7,1 8,4 8,4
Public sector employment 47644 21,1 25,1 33,5
Education and training 60417 26,8 31,8 65,3
Services and sanctions 28928 12,8 15,2 80,5
Integration programs 32317 14,3 17,0 97,5
Measures for the disabled 4834 2,1 2,5 100,00
Total programs 190158 84,2 100,00
Missing values 35594 15,8
Individuals in the dataset 225752 100,00   
80,5% of the total sample is represented by the four main groups of programs defined in 
previous section. Within the private sector employment programs’ category, the highest 
frequency participation is observed for private job training (10815) followed by Adult 
Apprenticeship and Labour trainee. Public individual job training (25856) represents the 
highest share of persons in the public sector employment programs’ category followed 
by  public job training , service jobs, voluntary not paid activities and pool jobs whith a 
non  significant  number  of  people.  The  Education/training  programs’ category  was 
widely used and concerns 26,8% of the entire sample. The most important measure in 
this  category  is  education  with  training  allowance  (49171)  and  specially  adapted 
educational activities (10317).  The distribution of people in services and sanctions is 
slightly  the  same  between  intensive  job  seeking  (14435)  and  advisory/introductory 
activation  (14493). In  line  with  the  Danish  Venstre  og  Konservative governements’ 
policy,  we  can  note  that  a  fairly  amount  of  individuals  has  been  enrolled  in  an 
integration program (14,3% of the entire sample). Measures for the disabled represent 
only  2,1% of  the  entire  sample.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  one  of  the  Danish  labour 
market’s peculiarities when in most of European countries only passive expenditures are 
implemented as regards this group of people. 
Three variables of  interest  have been identified:  i)  transitions  to work at  the end of 
November 2003 WORK03 and 2004 WORK04, ii) transitions to full-time job at the end 
of November 2003 FULLTIME03 and 2004 FULLTIME04 (these variables are dummies 
made  from  two  categorical  variables  related  to  the  “socio  economic  statuses”  and 
“extent of working”), iii) Wage level (continuous variable) at the end of November 2003 
WAGE03 and 2004 WAGE04.
Note that we dispose of the same information for the last job occupied by those who 
where wage earners one year before ended an activation programs. Transversal data will 
allow us to depict the dynamics of employment (cf.Appendix 3). Various explanatory 
variables have been included in the analyses. We can classify them in three categories:
The first  category refers to background variables which may have an impact  on 
work  supply.  Because  these  variables  are  categorical,  modalities  have  been 
dichotomized as dummies to appear correctly in treatment effects models' outputs. We 
have a set of variables related to i) Age (AGE1825, AGE2530, AGE3035, AGE3540,  
AGE4045, AGE50andmore), ii) Gender (FEMALE), iii) family type (COUPWCHILD,  
COUPNOCHILD,  SINGWCHILD),  iv)  level  of  education  attainment  (BASCHOOL,  
UPSECEDU,  VOCTRAINEDU,  SHCYCHIGHEDU,  MEDCYCHIGHEDU, 
BACHELOREDU,  LONGCYCHIGHEDU),  v)  origin  (IMIGWESC,  IMIGNOTWESC,  
DESWESC, DESNOTWESC). We use in the evaluation traditional background variables 
such as age, gender, level of education attainment and add “family type» and “origin” 
variables. The “family type” can have an impact on the job finding rate and the extent of 
working time but also on the selection process at entry as single parents may prefer short 
training  period  to  cope  with  family  responsibilities.  The  “origin”  variable  has  been 
included  as  well  because  immigrants  can  find  difficulties  compared  to  natives  or 
descendants in terms of employment and/or wages.
The second category refers to information about the last job occupied and include 
variables such as: i) types of industry (SAGRFISH, SMANUFACT, SELECTGWATER,  
SCONSTRUCT, SRETHOREST, STRANSPORTELE, SFINBUSIN, SPUBLPERSERV), ii) 
types of occupation  (SELFEMP, TOPMANAGER, EMPUPLEVEL, EMPMEDLEVEL,  
EMBASLEVEL) ,  iii)  work  experience (NOWORKEXP,  F5TO10YEXP,  
EMORE10YEXP).  Employment history and pre-program variables notably as regards 
“work  experience”  have  been  included  because  these  indicators  influence  both  the 
variables of  interest  and the selection process.  Unemployed with less  labour market 
attachment provide bad signals to the employment agencies and be then the victims of 
creaming  effects.  The  “types  of  industry”  tell  us  whether  unemployed  worked  in 
expanding sectors or not. This variable may influence the likelihood of finding a job. 
The third category encompasses instrumental variables (Z) which  help to identify 
the treament's effect and make the estimates more robust. These instrumental variables 
must fulfil two conditions i) be correlated with the program's entrance (Y1): corr (Z,ζ) ≠ 
0 (null hypothesis rejected, the correlation coefficient is strictly different from zero), ii) 
be exogenous (not correlated with the variable of interest or more precisely with the 
error  terms  (ξ)  of  the  second  step  equation):  corr  (Z,ξ)  =  0  (null  hypothesis  is  not 
rejected, the correlation coefficient may be equal to zero). A first instrumental dummy 
variable about being insured or not has been included (INSURE). This variable is highly 
correlated with the selection process but still has an impact on some variables of interest 
(i.e. the job finding rate because of skills bias). Therefore, another instrument variable 
has also been added. This last one refers to counties (Amter) unemployed belong to and 
is well justified for the period used because of the decentralisation process of ALMPs 
implementation  to  the  14 labour  market  councils  (cf.  Subsection  3.2).  This variable 
shows more significant results for both conditions. The counties variable has also been 
dichotomized as dummies (KOBEN, FREDER, KOBENAMT, FREDEAMT, ROSKAMT, 
VESTAMT,  STORAMT,  FYNAMT,  SONDAMT,  RIBAMT,  VEJAMT,  RINGAMT,  
ARHAMT, VIBAMT, NORDAMT).
 
3.2 Selectivity and targeting
In order to address the sample selection or endogeneity problem, an evaluation of the 
determinants of program participation has to be made. If our sample fulfils the eligibility 
rules,  the selection decisions of  caseworkers  are  indeed  influenced by the economic 
situation of unemployed as well as the political orientation formulated by the labour 
market  councils.  Employment  history  and  the  state  of  the  local  economy matter  to 
understand how unemployed end up in different programs (Heckman & Smith, 2004). In 
the same way, unemployed according to their motivation and ability may prefer to join 
short time programs which do not affect too much their leisure time (Lechner & al, 
2004). We can also expect that participation in ALM programs declines with age. As 
regards the empirical determinants of program participation, we should wonder whether 
there are  creaming effects  or not. “Creaming” among participants happens when the 
most likely to succeed without the treatment are selected instead of unemployed who 
should benefit the most from the program (highest social return on the investment in 
activation). This situation occurs mainly when the performance of programs is measured 
primarily  by  job  placement  rates.  An efficient  profiling  system can  help  to  counter 
ingrained behaviour (Bell & Orr, 2002). It matters to consider this issue because such a 
situation leads both to inefficient allocation of public resources and biased effects as 
regards ALMPs (Andersen & al., 1993). Besides, this analysis will allow us to identify 
who benefits from the active labour market and evaluate how the target groups of the 
ALMPs programs differ from each other. Thus, it will partly solve the issue of what 
happens to the general considerations regarding the different corners of the “flexicurity 
triangle” when the analysis is broken down into various sub-groups. The selectivity of 
recruitment  in  the  selected  activation  programs  has  been  analysed  via  logistic 
regressions (log-odds):
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From the set of  explanatory variables  described in previous  sub-section,  the logistic 
regression  allows us  to predict  discrete  outcomes related  to participation in  a  given 
programs’ category with a probability of success  θ (x) = θ (di=1) and a probability of 
failure 1-θ (x) = θ (di=0). After isolating θ (x) from the logistic equation7, we obtain the 
probability  of  entering  (1.2)  and  not  entering  (1.3)  in  one  of  the  selected  type  of 
programs:  
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α represents the constant and βi the coefficients8 of the predictors that is the individual 
characteristics (x) of people as well as the regional dummies. By getting rid of the log, 
the odd ratio (exp β) is easier to interpret than the logits (log odds, β) which refer to the 
estimated  change  in  the  log  odds  of  the  dependent  variable  per  unit  change  in  the 
predictor variable. The odd ratio (exp β) is the base of the natural logarithm rose to the 
power of the logit, and can be interpreted as the change in odds resulting from a unit 
change in the predictor9.
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8. The β coefficients are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function “L”:
9. If one unit is added to the original logit, either x1 +1, the log odds equation will be:
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By  simplifying  the  equation  we  finally  get  ln  [odds1/odds2]  =  β1. Thus, the  exponential 
transformation gives us the odd ratio = eβ1 = [odds1/odds2].            
Because  explanatory  variables  have  been  defined  as  categorical  in  our  model, 
coefficients reported in table 2 can be interpreted as marginal effects of an independent 
variable category compared with a reference category (exp β =1). 
Table 2. points out that unemployed participating in the four categories of programs 
slightly  differ  as  regards  background  and  pre-program  variables.  Public  sector 
employment programs which are theoretically designed for the less able focus much 
more on the youth, unemployed with less work experience and with a relatively short 
education.
If we look at background variables, individuals with lower education level attainment 
(ISCED (International  Standard Classification of Education),  i.e.  basic  school))  have 
better  chance to  be  involved  for  both private  and public  employment  programs.  As 
regards gender,  female  are more likely to participate to education/training programs. 
This result is consistent with recent analyses (see Hansen, 2007). If integration programs 
are removed, immigrants and descendants have greater odds in entering into training and 
education programs. The participation declines with age for employment programs and 
education/training programs. We may suppose that the amortisation period of the human 
capital  investment  shrinks  for  the  eldest  group of  unemployed.  These results  are  in 
concomitance with the high number of people in retirement schemes at this time. When 
we look at last job, sector of employment and type of job don’t affect that much the 
selection  process.  Which  is  important  to  note  is  that  we  have  a  creaming effect as 
regards private sector  employment programs.  The odds in entering into this  type of 
programs are about 2 times better than the reference group for those with more than 10 
years work experience. Even though services and sanctions programs should in principle 
focus  on  the  most  vulnerable  groups,  those  who were  employed  at  the  upper  level 
appear to enjoy a better access. The reason may come from the underlying “work first” 
strategy  of  these  programs  which  are  more  profitable  for  the  most  resourceful 
unemployed. We can also suppose that because this group of unemployed benefits from 
social network they are more able to find a job quickly, thus making public intervention 
unnecessary.  This  dead-weight  effect  can  be  better  evaluated  through  qualitative 
investigations.  The  different  modalities  within  the  tow  instrument  variables 
(unemployment insurance and counties) appear to have significant results as regards the 
selection process. People with no insurance have greater odds in entering into public 
employment sector programs. The decentralisation of ALMPs implementation brings to 
the fore clear evidence about counties autonomy with respect to the local labour market 
context.   
Table 2. The odds of being involved in one of the selected programs
Ind. variables/type of activation 
programs
Private emp 
sector
Public emp 
sector
Education
/training
Services
/sanctions
exp β exp β exp β exp β
Age
([18-25]) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
[26-30] 1,091 0,726*** 1,389*** 0,917*
[31-35] 1,105 0,745*** 1,343*** 1,044
[36-40] 1,033 0,730*** 1,279*** 1,065
[41-45] 0,917 0,769*** 1,255*** 1,124**
[46-50] 0,867* 0,852*** 1,230*** 1,125**
[51+] 0,614*** 1,232*** 0,998 1,283***
Gender
(Male) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Female 0,698*** 0,893*** 1,165*** 1,135***
Family type
(Couples with children) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Couples without children 1,032 1,005 0,881*** 1,041
Singles with children 0,930 1,164*** 0,943 0,992
Singles without children 0,901* 1,195*** 0,837*** 1,073**
Highest education completed
(Basic school/preparatory) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
General upper secondary 0,820*** 0,856*** 1,008 1,209***
Vocational training and edu. 1,127*** 0,811*** 1,067*** 1,134***
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,978 0,600*** 1,210*** 1,379***
Medium-cycle higher edu. 0,756*** 0,667*** 1,325*** 1,082
Bachelor edu. 0,896 0,509*** 1,491*** 0,909
Long cycle higher edu. 0,869 0,647*** 1,549*** 1,070
Origin
(Danish) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Immigrant western country 1,174 0,819** 1,162** 0,849**
Immigrant non-western country 0,919 0,610*** 1,801*** 0,577***
Descendant western country 0,747 1,047 1,141 0,899
Descendant non-western country 0,772 0,745 1,191 1,025
Sector of employment (last job)
(Agriculture, fishing, quarrying) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Manufacturing 1,110 0,860** 1,021 1,055
Electricity, gas and water supply 0,952 0,716*** 1,251*** 0,954
Construction 1,140 0,964 0,881** 1,144**
Retail trade, hotel and restaurants 1,372 0,897** 0,872*** 1,089*
Transport, post and telecom 1,150 0,883* 0,975 1,067
Finance and business activities 0,883 1,373*** 0,807*** 0,959
Public and personal service 0,460 1,501*** 0,950 0,917*
Type of job (last job)
(Self-employed) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Top manager 0,833 0,736 0,931 1,328
Employees upper level 1,113 0,729*** 0,987 1,208***
Employees medium level 1,052 0,777*** 0,973 1,033
Employees basic level 1,114 1,298*** 0,919* 0,887**
Other employees 1,200** 1,623*** 0,786*** 0,803***
Work experience (last job)
(No work experience) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Up to 5 years experience 1,873*** 1,144 0,774*** 1,094
Between 6 years and 10 years 1766*** 0,999 0,967 1,096
More than 11 years experience 1,999*** 0,800** 1,100 1,003
Unemployment insurance
(Not insured) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
insured 1,264*** 0,306*** 6,923*** 2,897***
Counties Amter
(Københavns) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00)
Frederiksberg 1,987*** 2,681*** 1,599*** 2,026***
Københavns Amt 1,978*** 4,637*** 1,433*** 1,853***
Frederiksborg Amt 3,335*** 7,072*** 0,965 1,906***
Roskilde Amt 2,492*** 8,375*** 1,904*** 0,919
Vestjællands Amt 2,724*** 5,184*** 3,636*** 0,362***
Storstrøms Amt 2,683*** 9,278*** 1,178*** 1,234***
Bornholms region 1,943*** 5,846*** 2,233*** 0,844
Fyns Amt 2,454*** 3,256*** 1,786*** 0,772***
Sønderjyllands Amt 3,755*** 9,085*** 1,885*** 0,580***
Ribe Amt 3,406*** 9,013*** 2,433*** 0,192***
Vejle Amt 3,679*** 7,088*** 1,189*** 1,266***
Ringkøbing Amt 4,719*** 8,467*** 1,519*** 0,623***
Århus Amt 2,332*** 6,152*** 1,422*** 1,715***
Viborg Amt 3,165*** 7,122*** 1,325*** 1,106*
Nordjyllands Amt 3,368*** 7,203*** 2,867*** 0,307***
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 
0,01)
In brackets are the reference categories for each qualitative variable.  The unemployment insurance and 
counties variables represent the instrument variables used for a robust identification of the effects in the 
sample selection models.
4. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
This  section  aims  at  providing  explanations  about  the  methodology  applied  to  the 
identification of treatment effects and how selection bias in ALM programs is controlled 
for.  One  of  the  main  difficulties  in  evaluating  ALMPs  is  to  take  into  account 
conterfactuals which refer to “possible outcomes in different hypothetical states of the 
world” (Heckman, 2008). In other words counterfactuals refer to the potential outcomes 
if  individuals  had  not  been  treated.  Therefore,  the  main  issue  is  how to obtain  the 
treatment effect of those treated compared to a state, where they were not treated. Since 
participation  in  a  program  is  compulsory  for  unemployed  in  Denmark  it  has  been 
difficult  to  determine  a  “control  group”  (unemployed  who  did  not  enter  into  an 
activation program). Previous analyses on the Danish labour market underscored that 
because unemployed have to participate in a ALM program at some point in time, those 
who stay unemployed long enough are few (Munch & Skipper, 2008). 
Recourse to internal “control groups” composed of those who quit activation programs 
could have been a solution. They may represent interesting “control groups” because 
they fulfil  the requirements for participating in ALM programs. Nevertheless, such a 
strategy can be subject to important bias because individuals may leave because either 
they are less motivated or they find jobs by themselves during their participation in the 
programs (most resourceful group of unemployed). One of the most advanced methods 
to build up counterfactuals for compulsory programs is to apply the  timing-of-events 
model from Abbring & van den Berg (2003). The basic idea is that the starting dates of 
program  participation  vary  among  individuals  during  the  unemployment  spells. 
Therefore,  unemployed  who  are  not  yet  participating  in  ALMPs  are  used  as  a 
comparison group over this time interval that is until they enter in one of the program 
(Lalive  & al.,  2008;  Munch  & Skipper,  2008).  Even  though  this  kind  of  model  is 
relevant in many aspects, we can expect that the degree of variation over time until entry 
is shrinking due to the removal of the passive period since the year 2002. Besides, the 
assumption is based on hazard functions and thus implies the use of weekly longitudinal 
data.  Unfortunately,  when  making  the  analyses,  we  did  not  have  such  data  at  our 
disposal. To overcome this problem, each program category is considered in its turn as 
“treatment group” when value 1 is assigned to them. All other program categories set up 
the  “comparison  group”  taking  the  value  0.  Therefore,  program categories  compete 
among one another. At some point, counterfactuals correspond to the potential outcomes 
when individuals participate in programs other than the one investigated. In our paper, 
effects  are  forward-looking  which  means  that  a  baseline  forecast  is  required.  The 
baseline simulation was generated for three consecutive years knowing that participants 
ended their activation period at the end of the year 2002. Because some measures last 
for a short time and others for several months, when analyzing post-program effects it is 
more accurate to follow participants whose activation program is over rather than those 
who just started one.
Individuals participating in an activation program (treatment group) should theoretically 
be similar to those who did not participate except for the treatment status which can 
influence  the  dependent  variables.  Only  the  participation  in  programs varies  among 
individuals. Such an assumption cannot easily be checked because of selection bias or 
omitted  variable  bias  (Heckman,  1979).  In  our  analysis,  selection  bias  arises  when 
participants  in  an  activation  program  may  differ  from  other  participants  on  both 
observed and unobserved characteristics. Unobserved characteristics refer to variables 
that are difficult to measure  (i.e. ability, motivation, state of mind, social network)  or 
cannot  be  observed.  Besides  self-selection,  participants  are  also  subjected  to  non-
random  selection  process  by  the  employment  services  and  employers.  Statistically 
speaking, selection bias occurs when observed and unobserved factors which influence 
the odds of being involved in one program also influence the impact of the program. 
Therefore, simple regression estimates of programs’ effects may be statistically biased 
when factors that impact participation decisions are correlated with outcome measures. 
If observed characteristics are easy to control the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity 
imply the use of specific econometric. 
In our analysis, Treatment Effects models have been used to provide unbiased estimates 
of programs’ impacts. These extensions of the Heckman’s two-step procedure or sample 
selection  model  (1979)  are  based  on  a  simultaneous  estimation  of  two  regression 
functions:  the  first  one analysis  the selection  process  at  entry  while  the second one 
provides unbiased estimates of the impact of program participation on outcomes. More 
details about the procedure are given throughout the section. Note that Treatment Effects 
models may vary according to the nature of the dependent variables. Among procedures 
for addressing selection bias10,  the two-step adjustment has the advantage of providing 
an estimate of the specification error while modelling the selection process11. Because of 
the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables WORK03-04 and FULLTIME03-04, a 
seemingly  unrelated  bivariate  probit  with endogeneity  (Maddala,1983;  Fabbri  & al., 
2004) has been estimated first.  The model takes the following form with two probit 
regressions:
ζβ += ii XY 111*                                             (2.1)
ξδδ ++= iii XYY 22112*                                                       (2.2)
Y*1i and  Y*2i are  latent  variables  measuring  i)  selection  to  one  specific  programs 
category and ii) the transitions to work and/or full time job : Y1i = 1 (Y1i is observed) if 
Y*1i > 0 and  Y2i = 1 (Y2 is  observed)  if  Y*2i > 0.  X1i and  X2i refer  to the observed 
determinants (or vector of covariates),  β1 and  δ2 to the associated parameters.  In the 
second equation (2.2),  Y1i is a binary treatment dummy whose unbiased effect δ1 is the 
object  of  interest.  Among  the  explonatory  variables  X1i in  the  first-step  selection 
equation  (2.1)  we  must  identify  at  least  one  instrument  variable  (Z)  which  fits  the 
following conditions:  corr (Z, ζ) ≠ 0 et  corr (Z, ξ) = 0.  The error terms (or random 
disturbance) of the two equations  ζ and  ξ are dependent and distributed as a bivariate 
normal so that:  E(ζ) = E(ξ) = 0, var (ζ) = var (ξ) = 1) and ρ = cov(ζ, ξ). In other terms, 
ρ  aims at testing the error terms correlation. The Wald test provides evidence on the 
correlation between the unobserved variables of the two equations. If ρ is significantly 
different  from zero,  then the  null  correlation  between the  error  terms  is  rejected.  It 
means that  Y1 is endogenous for the second equation. Therefore, the two equations are 
dependent and the  effects of programs can be subjected to selection bias.  Conversely, 
when ρ = 0, then Y1 is exogenous for the second equation and the use of sample selection 
models are not justified. 
_______________________________________
10.  Besides the Heckman two-step procedure,  instrumental  variable (IV) and longitudinal methods (i.e. 
“fixed effects” and differences-in-differences estimators) can be performed as well depending of the dataset.
11. In order to shorten the presentation, results from the first step equation have not been reported in the 
appendix. One can refer to the previous section for an overview of the selection process at entry. All results 
are still available upon request.
Assuming that error terms are jointly normally distributed, the simultaneously estimate 
of the two probit regressions is based on the maximum likelihood12.  As for the variable 
WAGE03-04, because of its continuous nature, an endogenous treatment effects model 
has been used (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman & Robb, 1985): 
ζβ += ii XY 111*                                             (2.3)
ξλδδδ +++= 322112 iii XYY      (2.4)
With ζ following a normal law of  N (0;1) and ξ a normal law of N (0;σ ζ). The terms in 
the first  step equation (2.5)  are similar  to those in the  seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit. The aim is to estimate the causal effects of a binary variable Y1i (participation or 
not to one of the programs category) on wage level Y2i after participating in an activation 
program. The first equation is estimated by probit model whereas the second one (2.4) is 
estimated  by  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  because  of  the  continuous  nature  of  the 
dependent variable. Assuming that error terms taken jointly are normally distributed, the 
simultaneous estimate of the two regressions is based on the maximum likelihood13. The 
inverse  Mills'  ratio  or  selection  hazard  (ø  (β1, X1)/  Ф (β1,X1)):  standard  normal 
probability  density  function  over  standard  cumulative  function)  extracted  from  the 
probit  model  is  integrated  as  an  additional  regressor  (λ) in  the  second-step  to  take 
account of the selection bias. The parameter of the Mills' ratio (δ3) provides an estimate 
of  the selection bias.  Note  that  the computation of the  inverse  Mills'  ratio  does not 
appear in the biprobit model because the estimation can only be performed by the Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FMIL) on most  statistical  softwares.  The inverse 
Mills'  ratio   is  computed  in  the  second-step  only  if  the  treatment  effects  model  is 
performed by using the two-step maximum likelihood rather than the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FMIL) (in case of nonconvergeance)14. 
_______________________________________
12. See Fabbri & al. (2004) 
13. See Heckman’s models
14. The two-step maximum likelihood has been used for the estimation of the wage equation.
Therefore, when using the two-step estimation in treatment effects models, instead of ρ 
estimation, the relevance of the treatment effects model is based on the significance of 
the non selection hazard coefficient. The interpretation of the significance is the same 
than  ρ described for the bivariate probit model. It gives an idea of the two equation 
dependency and the relevance of the sample selection model compared to one simple 
linear regression. Contrary to models described above, when selection is among a large 
number  of exclusive choices,  the multinomial  logit  specification (Mc Fadden,  1973) 
exposed in details by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) should be preferred. If 
we look at the 6 activation categories designed in section (3.2), at least 4 of them are in 
principle targeted towards every unemployed. 
In actual fact, there are substantial differences between programs’ categories which do 
not  fully  justified  the  use  of  multi-treatment  analysis  for  the  first-step  equation. 
Although individuals are not eligeable for all programs’ categories multitreatment could 
provide supplementary informations as regards effects on different groups. Because of 
their  peculiarities,  targeted  programs  towards  immigrants  and  disabled  have  been 
removed.  The  dependent  variable  in  the  selection  equation  contains  four  modalities 
whereas the dependent in the outcome equation is only observed for one modality (or 
one programs' category).  When using multi-treatment  models  the form taken by the 
dependent  variables  slightly  differ  from univariate or  binary models.  In this  kind of 
models, the dependent in the selection equation is a multiple choices one. Besides, the 
outcome variable is observed for only one modality of the categorical variable about 
activation programs (see Bourguignon & al., 2004). The rest of the sample is therefore 
censored in the second-step equation. Note that this kind of models does not fit with 
impact evaluations because no coefficient (δ1) is assigned to the programs’ effect in the 
second equation. Nevertheless, the use of censored data in the second equation allows us 
to compare  δ2 coefficients between programs (see Appendix 3 to 6). The covariances 
between  residuals  mx from  the  multinomial  logistic  regression  and  the  second  step 
regression provide tests for endogeneity. 
5. RESULTS
Results from the first-step equation as well as targeted programs have not been included 
in order not to complicate the presentation. All results are still available upon request. 
Each  coefficient  reported  in  tables  A1  to  A8  in  Appendix  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
probability  conditional  on  the  other  observables  which  belong  to  the  same  initial 
categorical variable. ρ and the hazard  λ  are significantly different from zero (except for 
private employment sector as regards the wage level variable). Thus, the hypothesis of 
endogeneity between the selection equation and the outcome equation is verified.
After taking due account of the observed and unobserved heterogeneity, private job 
training has a significant positive effect (δ1=1,25) as regards transitions to work in the 
retrospective  two years  after  participation  (cf.  Tables  3  and A1).  This positive  post-
program effect confirms previous empirical evidence (see Rosholm & Svarer (2004)). 
The private sector employment category gets the highest score as regards job finding 
rates. The conditional probability that private sector beneficiaries stay in employment 
two years after,  given that they successfully managed to find a job one year after is 
80,2% (cf.  Table A9). The employment rate increases  in the highest  proportion (∆Yi 
=35,3) for  participants  to  this  type  of  programs  (cf.  Table  A10).  The  difference  in 
comparison with the other type of programs is the most important as well (βddd = 29,1). 
Let’s  notice  that,  for  all  programs  participants  who  were  wage  earners  before  the 
baseline, the employment rate fairly improves. The relative evolution of the employment 
rate is negative only for previous wage earners who ended a public sector employment 
program. The outcome regression depicts a significant negative coefficient (δ1= -0,64) 
for this type of programs which means that participants are less likely to find a job (cf. 
Tables 3 and A2). The well-known argument is that private job training beneficiaries are 
generally more skilled than those in public job training and can be hired afterwards if 
they fit employers’ needs (Langager, 1997). In our analysis, the large positive effect of 
the private sector employment programs’ category is not the result of skills bias (cf. 
Table 2) but may be attributed to the greater work experience of participants. Besides, 
jobs provided by this type of programs are closer the “ordinary” labour market. Such a 
situation leads to “contact effect”. That is private job training creates contact between 
employers and marginalized groups who can be hired afterwards in the firm where the 
activation has been completed. As regards recruitment, we must acknowledge that the 
number  of  available  jobs  (thus  job  opportunities  for  private  sector  employment 
participants) is highly depending on the business cycle (Raaum & al., 2002). Let’s notice 
that  for  the  retrospective  years  used  in  the  analysis,  the  economic  conjuncture  was 
favourable after an economic downswing between 2001 and the mid-2003 (for further 
details, see figure 1). 
Education/training programs’ category have rather small positive impacts (δ1= 0,55) (cf. 
Tables 3 and A3). Results obtained for this type of programs are in line with previous 
studies. Nevertheless, this group of programs is very heterogeneous if we look at the job 
finding rates (cf. Table A9). Some programs perform better than others when they come 
with a subsidy.  62,7% of participants  in Adult  education subsidies  find a job while 
94,4% of them manage to keep their job after the first year in employment. 
As regards services/sanctions programs, when the much used category “other type of 
activation programs” is narrowed to intensive job seeking and advisory activation, the 
post-program effects on transitions to work are slightly positive (δ1= 0,44) (cf. Tables 3 
and A4).  This result is consistent with recent micro econometrical evaluations. Taking 
into counterfactuals through an experimental study Graversen & van Ours (2005) show 
that Post-program effects on the job finding rate for a two weeks intensive job seeking is 
higher in the treatment group than in the control group (those who do not participate to 
the program). The job finding rate for unemployed who participated in intensive job 
seeking is the results of a better and the threat of having to attend training programs or 
being unemployed (Graversen & van Ours, 2005).  This significant positive effect and 
the lower cost  of this  type of programs should deserve particular interest  as regards 
today labour market policy orientation in Denmark. 
All things being equal,  these positive results can be attributed to  dead-weight effects 
depicted in the selection equation. The argument that services and sanctions are more 
efficient for individuals with higher skilled is not verified in our analysis. 
The multinomial  logistic regression estimates show that  participants to intensive job 
seeking  may  expect  positive  transitions  to  work  whatever  their  educational  level 
attainment (cf. Tables A5 to A8). The same goes for the other type of programs even 
though the results are not always significant.  The use of censored data in the second 
equation  for  multinomial  logit  models  allows  us  to  yield  some  disparities  between 
programs among sub-groups. Public sector employment and education/training appear to 
be more effective when targeting to less skilled people (cf. Tables A6 and A7). Despite 
the type of programs participants are involved, some groups appear to have better labour 
market  prospects than  others.  If  we  look  at  other  observed  factors,  the  origin-
geographical interactions suggest that immigrants from non-western countries are less 
likely  to  find  a  job  compared  to  unemployed  with  Danish  origin,  immigrants  and 
descendants from western countries (cf. Tables A5 to A8). The employment probability 
of immigrants compared to natives is one of the lowest in Europe (Causa & Jean, 2007). 
Another discriminating aspect of the Danish labour market is that unemployed who are 
more than 50 years old are less likely to find a job than those who belong to other age 
brackets. The youth are the most positively associated with the job finding rates. Until 
now, the strategy concerning the eldest unemployed has been to keep them outside the 
labour  market  through  early  retirement  schemes.  Indeed,  a  substantial  part  of  the 
population (27%) remains outside the labour market and thus, depends on the various 
welfare programs. Let’s notice that the “unemployed” represents only a small proportion 
(14%) of the “did not work” category which mostly comprises those “out of the work 
force” (Blache, 2007 (1)). The eldest has proved to be the first victims of the Danish 
flexible labour market (Jensen, 2007). Nowadays, employment and welfare systems in 
Denmark but also in most European countries are faced to new stakes notably due to 
demographical changes. Raising labour supply is a crucial linchpin to safeguard welfare 
and anticipate the growing share of retired population in the future. Expanding the range 
of employment opportunities for the eldest  as well  as the tightening of fiscal should 
become one of the priorities of the Danish government. The June 2006 agreement has 
given recommendations to that end by developing age management (Jensen, 2007). The 
set of determinants as regards the last job occupied is relevant too: those with a greater 
work experience and who were upper level employees are more likely to find a job (cf. 
Table A5 to A8). Gender does not affect transitions to work while singles with children 
show more difficulties to find a job. The reason may come from the lower flexibility of 
this group in the labour market as regards spatial and temporal mobility (Soidre, 2004). 
Even though the Danish public  day care  system is  recognized for the quality  of  its 
services (Hansen, 2007), tuition costs for full-time care are too high for single parents 
with lower attachment to the labour market.  Even though Denmark performs best in 
terms  of  empowerment  from  a  life-at-work  perspective  (Blache,  2007  (2)),  single 
parents which are mainly women have more difficulties than other to cope with both 
work and family life. 
The likelihood of the unemployed lone mother to find a job has long been constrained 
by discrimination. Danish local authorities frequently asked for a disposable income as 
regards day care fees, thus priorities full-time working parents (Slotz, 1997).
As regards qualitative outcomes all programs positively influence the transitions to 
full time job except for public employment programs (δ1= -1,37). The reason might be 
the missing helping hand qualification so that beneficiaries have to narrow their  job 
search to part-time low productive activities.  The observed characteristics  show that 
flexibility is mainly applied to young workers,  immigrants and those with less work 
experience. Individuals from the retail trade, hotel and restaurants sector and those who 
were selfemployed are also more exposed to part time job. It is also stated that the extent 
of working time is not affected by the family type and the education level attainment 
variables. We must aknowledge that the permissive legislation as regards employment 
protection and the  retraining requirements in a more egalitarian perspective make the 
insider-outsider labour market in Denmark less rigid than in most European countries. 
One of the Danish peculiarities is that internal numerical flexibility based on the extent 
of working time creates a type-of-contract segmentation among high-skilled workers on 
flexible employment relationships. A group of academically-qualified workers accepts 
insecure and atypical employment in order not to loose their attachment to the labour 
market whereas others are well-paid ”free agents” (Jørgensen, 2000). The situation of 
the first category of workers concerns the economic sectors where the competition and 
the level of unemployment are the highest. In a theoretical perspective it can suggest a 
new interpretation  of the implicit  contract  theory  to control  adverse  risk (Azariadis, 
1975). In the longer run, the extent of working time should matter in the analyses of 
individual  trajectories  because  it  can  affect  prospects  and  working  life  regardless 
depending on the legislation settings.  Compared to some European countries,  casual 
work  in  Denmark  is  independent  from employment  history  and  is  submitted  to  the 
Salaried Employees Act when the employment contract lasts more than three months. As 
for  the  legal  protection  related  to  dismissal,  compensation  differs  according  to  the 
duration of the employment. Training opportunities are also more important for full-time 
workers.  The  extent  of  working  time  is  therefore  submitted  to  both  elements  of 
decommodification and segmentation. 
The  wage  level  variable  shows  a  different  picture  of  programs’effects. 
Education/training programs perform best compared to other programs  (δ1=19,25).  In 
line with human capital theory (Becker, 1964), unemployed who participate in labour 
market training programs can expect an increase of their productivity in the long-term 
and thus apply for  a higher wage (Dearden  & Van Reenen,  2005).  Referring to job 
search models (Mortensen, 1977) unemployed increase their reservation and thus may 
also extend the unemployment duration.  The  multinomial logit  models show that the 
less  skilled  unemployed  have  greater  opportunities  in  terms  of  wage  levels  when 
participating  into  education/training  programs  (cf.  Table  A7).  Besides,  individual 
characteristics highly influence the wage level whichever the program is. Unemployed 
with medium-or long-cycle higher education and with longer labour market attachment 
can expect greater salary. 
The  segmentation  is  more  obvious  as  regards  wage  in  comparison  with  the  other 
variables of interest. Let’s notice that in Denmark the spread of the salary range remains 
small with a Gini coefficient of 0,22.
Coefficients are negative but no significant for public and private sector employment 
programs.  These  results  are  consistent  with  recent  evaluations  (Munch  &  Skipper, 
2008).  Following  Becker’s  distinction  between  “specific”  and  “general”  capital, 
employment programs provide skills that can not be used effectively outside the firms 
where the training period has been completed. Therefore, participants can not apply for a 
higher wage outside the firm where skills were acquired. A stigmatization effect can also 
be put forward. Subsidized programs could indeed be perceived by employers as to be a 
signal of lower-than-average productivity (Munch & Skipper, 2008). When looking at 
background characteristics, the education level attainment labour market attachment and 
type of occupation as regards last jobs occupied matter in the wage level structure. 
Besides, unemployed youth get more difficulties in getting a high paid job after ending 
an activation period. The same remark can be formulated for gender. Strong disparities 
are depicted between female and male when looking at the wage level. 
Table 3. Summary of the main Post-program effects+
Programs/var.of interest Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Ind. earning (2)
 Transitions to work Full-time work Part-time work Wage levels
Private sector employment 1,2494*** 1,3709*** -1,6431*** -9,3215
(0,1015) (0,0247) (0,0273) (6,6621)
Public sector employment -0,6396*** -1,3709*** 1,3722*** -36,0249
(0,0447) (0,0390) (0,0442) (3,0808)
Education/training 0,5480*** 1,5813*** -1,7910*** 19,2522***
(0,0324) (0,0238) (0,0275) (2,2501)
Services and sanctions 0,4439*** 1,3960*** -1,5332*** 12,7363***
(0,0500) (0,0217) (0,0236) (3,0047)
Asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses, *significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% 
level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.  
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood.
+  Observed characteristics, multinomial logit estimates and test of endogeneity are reported in Appendix. 
Note  that  only results  for  the  year  2003 have  been reported.  Post-program effects  after  two years  are 
available upon request. Results in a longer period do not differ that much despite a slight increase over time.
6. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the main breakthroughs in the evaluation of ALMPs in Denmark, 
we came back to the intrinsic reasons of the Danish employment success. These are the 
favourable macroeconomic context and the corporatist agreements on designing labour 
market policies. Then, based on Danish micro-data, the paper dealt with ALMPs post-
program effects on various quantitative and qualitative outcome variables. We accounted 
for potential  unobserved heterogeneity and for potential  endogeneity issues  by using 
treatment effects with sample selection. 
The main findings about transitions to work are consistent with previous analyses. It is 
worth noticing that private sector employment programs perform best in terms of getting 
unemployed back to work. Besides, new lights have been yielded: firstly, the analysis 
provides suggestive evidence that services and sanctions programs have positive effects 
for each variable of interests. Secondly, the long-term effects of education and training 
programs are significantly positive. In line with human capital theory, unemployed who 
participate  into  labour  market  training  programs  are  more  prone  to  increase  their 
productivity in the long-term and thus apply for a higher wage. Good signals (in the 
sense of M.Spence, 1975) may as well be emitted to employers when the activation 
program comes with an education. In that perspective adult apprenticeship support can 
be a good example of how to combine education and wage subsidies. Obviously, further 
analyses based on employers' interviews are needed in this field. Besides, because job 
opportunities after activation are depending on the business cycle (especially for private 
sector employment programs), comparisons of the effects during economic upswing and 
economic downswing could also bring to the fore new insights. 
In a policy perspective, the good results obtained for services/sanctions programs 
justify the concern that more incentives and tailor made programs have to be developed 
in  order  to  fulfil  the  Danish  right  wing  motto  “getting  more  people  into  work”. 
Nevertheless, all things being equal, this kind of programs may be subjected to  dead-
weight effects. Thus, tighter controls of caseworkers should avoid such a situation when 
evaluation of programs is most of the time based on quantitative indicators such as the 
job finding rate. Built on a broad political consensus with a close involvement of social 
partners, ALMPs in Denmark can be seen as a textbook case in promoting collective 
dimensions of flexicurity in the sense of TLMs (Schmid & Gazier, 2002). Yet, concrete 
evidence  show  that  impacts  vary  noticeably  among  ALM  programs  in  Denmark, 
whereas  further  investigations  are  needed  as  regards  resources  and  capabilities  of 
vulnerable  groups.  According to economic circumstances,  the European governments 
should stress first  and foremost on specific programs. When the economic growth is 
sufficiently employment-intensive, employment policies can be used to ease placement 
of workers during retraining schemes or to face up to labour shortage in some sectors. In 
that case, education and training as well as intensive job seeking are the most effective 
measures  to  cope  with  labour  shortage.  During  a  slowdown  in  global  growth 
employment policies should act differently and be run at their utmost. 
Besides  guaranteeing  passive  expenditures  and  upgrading  unemployed  skills,  it  is 
necessary  to  push  down  recruitment  decisions  through  subsidised  employment 
programs, and thus reducing the cost of labour. If employment policies can act on job 
vacancies (i.e. direct creation of jobs in the public sector), this solution has proved to be 
inefficient  and  inconsistent  when  public  debt  reduction  stays  one  of  governments’ 
priorities.  Activation  is  also  a  crucial  linchpin  to  maintain  employment  policies  by 
reducing  moral  hazard  through  incentives  and  controlling  the  high  cost  of  passive 
expenditures.  Finally,  employment  policies  are  key issues  when dealing with labour 
market dynamics because of their role in the management of the process of job creation 
and destruction.
Three caveats have to be taken into account:  firstly, it has not been possible to take 
into  account  counterfactuals  so  that  the  analysis  has  been  made  in  a  comparative 
perspective  between  programs’  categories.  Since  participation  in  a  program  is 
compulsory  for  unemployed  in  Denmark  it  is  difficult  to  determine  a  real  “control 
group”. Even though new insights have been depicted by the use of qualitative variables, 
monthly information about the duration of employment spells after activation can bring 
to  the  fore  new  lights  as  regards  labour  market  integration.  Secondly,  once  the 
employment security guaranteed, the question is whether previously unemployed keep 
regular  jobs  over  time  or  not,  when  transitions  to  work  occurred  after  ending  an 
activation period.  Thirdly,  interactions between variables could have also been taken 
into account to focus on target groups who deserve particular interests in today labour 
market policies in Denmark (i.e. immigrants). 
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APPENDIX           Table A1. Post-Program effects of private employment programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.  
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood.
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2)
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Effects of private sec.emp. 1,2494*** (0,1015) 1,7235*** (0,0247) -1,6431*** (0,0273) -9,3215 (6,6621)
[18-25] 0,3406*** (0,0262) -0,2509*** (0,0423) 0,3821*** (0,0467) -8,5384*** (1,5091)
[26-30] 0,1648*** (0,0252) -0,0197 (0,0415) 0,1288*** (0,0460) 4,4229*** (1,4192)
[31-35] 0,1216*** (0,0246) -0,0126 (0,0407) 0,0994** (0,0454) 4,603*** (1,3616)
[36-40] 0,0564** (0,0241) -0,0229 (0,0404) 0,0678 (0,0456) 2,5982* (1,3442)
[41-45] 0,0748*** (0,0250) -0,0274 (0,0404) 0,0987** (0,0470) 3,1383** (1,3822)
[51+] -0,4129*** (0,0231) 0,0117 (0,0409) -0,0372 (0,0464) 1,4189 (1,3699)
Female 0,0503*** (0,0126) 0,1632*** (0,0199) -0,0961*** (0,0215) -16,8801*** (0,7417)
Couples with children 0,1394*** (0,0154) 0,0814*** (0,0246) -0,1509*** (0,0272) 0,1873 (0,8856)
Couples without children 0,1107*** (0,0150) 0,0283 (0,0237) -0,0384 (0,0253) 0,5121 (0,8778)
Singles with children -0,8732*** (0,0235) 0,0566 (0,0410) -0,1347*** (0,0451) -2,1652 (1,3906)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0186 (0,0332) 0,0727 (0,0538) -0,0497 (0,0583) -4,9026** (2,0904)
General upper secondary 0,2873*** (0,0371) -0,1704*** (0,0580) 0,1565** (0,0625) -4,086* (2,3284)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1544*** (0,0339) 0,1697*** (0,0549) -0,1607*** (0,0596) 1,2953 (2,1111)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2570*** (0,0440) 0,1956*** (0,0710) -0,2680*** (0,0798) 9,2560*** (2,6465)
Med.-cycle  higher edu. 0,2924*** (0,0410) 0,3563*** (0,0687) -0,4056*** (0,0772) 16,1781*** (2,5010)
Bachelor edu. 0,2909*** (0,0748) 0,4210*** (0,1257) -0,3704*** (0,1344) 18,1516*** (4,2868)
Long-cycle higher edu. 0,3425*** (0,0461) 0,4895*** (0,0771) -0,5568*** (0,0881) 30,3324*** (2,7894)
Immig. western country -0,0047 (0,0349) -0,0995* (0,0559) 0,1227** (0,0601) -3,0913 (2,1098)
Immig. non-west country -0,0538 (0,0194) -0,0256 (0,0303) -0,1048*** (0,0336) 2,1265* (1,1860)
Descendant west country 0,1421 (0,1050) 0,0177 (0,1574) -0,0010 (0,1698) 5,2739 (5,9780)
Desc.non-west country 0,0649 (0,5931) 0,0462 (0,0830) -0,1296 (0,0870) 4,2219 (3,5503)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0422 (0,0294) -0,1061** (0,0476) 0,1586*** (0,0520) -0,7215 (1,7460)
Manufacturing -0,0704** (0,0307) -0,1061** (0,0592) 0,1319** (0,0552) 6,2231*** (1,8025)
Electricity, gas and water -0,081** (0,0382) 0,0231 (0,0662) 0,0249 (0,0721) 2,0375 (2,1437)
Construction -0,0047 (0,0319) -0,1146** (0,0513) 0,0724 (0,0560) 11,3130*** (1,8463)
Rtrade, hotel a restaurants 0,0096 (0,0265) -0,2980*** (0,0422) 0,2849*** (0,0458) -2,0162 (1,6142)
Transport, post, telecom 0,0443 (0,0324) -0,1605*** (0,0518) 0,2146*** (0,0554) 5,9659*** (1,8947)
Finance and business -0,0921*** (0,0254) -0,1185*** (0,0425) 0,1332*** (0,0461) 0,6771 (1,5299)
Public and pers. service 0,0453* (0,0259) 0,0832* (0,0439) -0,0492 (0,0476) -6,6911*** (1,5523)
Self-employed 0,0843*** (0,0253) -0,4758*** (0,0370) -0,1779*** (0,0447) 6,5090*** (1,6786)
Top manager 0,0992 (0,0967) 0,3391** (0,1720) -0,2818 (0,1868) 44,5841*** (5,0981)
Employees upper level 0,1497*** (0,0314) 0,1875*** (0,0531) -0,2172*** (0,0604) 21,2610*** (1,8557)
Employees medium level 0,0680** (0,0267) 0,1908*** (0,0450) -0,2428*** (0,0510) 10,9061*** (1,4767)
Employees basic level 0,0261** (0,0128) 0,1426*** (0,0205) -0,1323*** (0,0217) 1,5153** (0,7398)
No work experience -0,0857* (0,0457) -0,1517** (0,0686) 0,0027 (0,0769) -8,5413** (3,5583)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1246*** (0,0161) 0,1886*** (0,0265) -0,1606*** (0,0288) 6,6961*** (0,9349)
More than 11 years 0,2242*** (0,0187) 0,2588*** (0,0314)  -0,2193*** (0,0350) 10,3901*** (1,0844)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - 4,2072 (3,5599)
Athrho -0,5230*** (0,0716) -2,2488*** (0,1149) 2,4792*** (0,0970) - -
LR test of rho=0                             Prob > chi2= 0.0000           Prob > chi2= 0.0000          Prob > chi2= 0.0000
Table A2. Post-Program effects of public employment programs
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2)
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Effects of public sec.emp. -0,6396*** (0,0447) -1,3709*** (0,0390) 1,3722*** (0,0442) -36,0249 (3,0808)
[18-25] 0,4139*** (0,0263) -0,1370*** (0,0469) 0,3378*** (0,0574) -5,2853*** (1,5760)
[26-30] 0,1680*** (0,0252) 0,0016 (0,0460) 0,1667*** (0,0570) 3,6020** (1,4593)
[31-35] 0,1243*** (0,0246) 0,0074 (0,0456) 0,1370** (0,0573) 3,6310** (1,4012)
[36-40] 0,0559** (0,0242) -0,0338 (0,0455) 0,1243** (0,0580) 1,8915 (1,3831)
[41-45] 0,0696*** (0,0251) -0,0105 (0,0477) 0,1373** (0,0604) 2,3546* (1,4218)
[51+] -0,4105*** (0,0230) -0,0202 (0,0462) -0,0098 (0,0600) 2,4856* (1,4095)
Female 0,01162 (0,0125) 0,1164*** (0,0215) -0,0410* (0,0246) -17,2094*** (0,7415)
Couples with children 0,1478*** (0,0153) 0,1897*** (0,0271) -0,3531*** (0,0325) -0,8305 (0,8856)
Couples without children 0,1102*** (0,0150) 0,0849*** (0,0255) -0,1201*** (0,0285) -0,8469 (0,8882)
Singles with children -0,0745*** (0,0236) 0,1423*** (0,0445) -0,2679*** (0,0523) -1,6601 (1,4256)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0376 (0,0333) 0,1030* (0,0573) -0,0657 (0,0662) -2,4582 (2,1551)
General upper secondary 0,2575*** (0,0372) -0,2519*** (0,0614) 0,2658*** (0,0701) -2,4574 (2,3826)
Vocational train.edu. 0,1529*** (0,0340) 0,2159*** (0,0588) -0,2228*** (0,0684) 1,9461 (2,1707)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2119*** (0,0443) 0,1468* (0,0775) -0,2914*** (0,0966) 8,7532*** (2,7152)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2368*** (0,0413) 0,2480*** (0,0743) -0,3256*** (0,0916) 15,7465*** (2,5474)
Bachelor edu. 0,2119*** (0,0753) 0,3228** (0,1378) -0,2751* (0,1567) 16,6568*** (4,3946)
Long-cycle higher edu. 0,2715*** (0,0465) 0,4135*** (0,0845) -0,5974*** (0,1103) 28,9744*** (2,8515)
Immig. western country -0,0285 (0,0351) -0,1379** (0,0603) 0,1742** (0,0688) -4,2816** (2,1681)
Immig. non-western country -0,1451*** (0,0199) -0,1789*** (0,0323) 0,0005 (0,0384) -0,9507 (1,2476)
Descendant western country 0,0983 (0,1054) -0,1597 (0,1618) 0,2234 (0,1782) 5,5486 (6,1442)
Desc. non-western country -0,0759 (0,0597) -0,2848*** (0,0858) 0,1920** (0,0917) -0,9383 (3,6665)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0116 (0,0293) 0,1016** (0,0512) -0,0700 (0,0594) -0,7637 (1,7734)
Manufacturing -0,03882 (0,0306) 0,1290** (0,0563) -0,1410** (0,0649) 5,1547*** (1,8103)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0822** (0,0384) 0,1674** (0,0754) -0,1103 (0,0858) -0,0476 (2,1976)
Construction 0,0182 (0,0318) 0,0023 (0,0555) -0,0882 (0,0649) 10,9907*** (1,8867)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0440* (0,0262) -0,1397*** (0,0415) 0,1077** (0,0517) -3,4236** (1,5864)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0481 (0,0325) -0,0428 (0,0560) 0,0925 (0,0634) 4,9436** (1,9182)
Finance and business -0,0750*** (0,0255) -0,0417 -0,0455 0,0565 (0,0521) 1,5470 (1,5707)
Public and personal service 0,0354 (0,0259) 0,0337 -0,0469 0,0203 (0,0539) -4,7501*** (1,5886)
Self-employed 0,0131 (0,0256) -0,7417*** -0,0386 -0,0005 (0,0506) 3,9452** (1,7378)
Top manager -0,0026 (0,0970) 0,2089 -0,1996 -0,1377 (0,2373) 43,0359*** (5,2375)
Employees upper level 0,0711** (0,0320) 0,1216** -0,0586 -0,1920*** (0,0736) 18,4719*** (1,9214)
Employees medium level -0,0066 (0,0272) 0,0939* -0,0507 -0,1542** (0,0618) 7,9732*** (1,5388)
Employees basic level -0,003 (0,0130) 0,1228** -0,0222 -0,1245*** (0,0246) -0,0885 (0,7730)
No work experience -0,1163** (0,0456) -0,1928*** -0,0696 0,0966 (0,0801) -7,4378** (3,6297)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1068*** (0,0162) 0,2131*** -0,0289 -0,2117 (0,0339) 5,5379*** (0,9659)
More than 11 years 0,1973*** (0,0189) 0,3764*** -0,0349  -0,4141*** (0,0431) 8,2489*** (1,1237)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - 17,2510*** (1,7879)
Athrho 0,3305*** (0,0303) 0,9361*** (0,0397) -0,8532*** (0,0407) - -
LR test of rho=0                        Prob > chi2= 0.0000        Prob > chi2= 0.0000         Prob > chi2= 0.0000
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate  probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.  
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood.
Table A3. Post-Program effects of education/training programs
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2)
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Effects of training 0,5480*** (0,0324) 1,5813*** (0,0238) -1,7910*** (0,0275) 19,2522*** (2,2501)
[18-25] 0,4143*** (0,0261) -0,0123 (0,0427) 0,1283*** (0,0493) -6,5627*** (1,5381)
[26-30] 0,1870*** (0,0250) 0,0941** (0,0415) -0,0049 (0,0488) 4,5756*** (1,4294)
[31-35] 0,1437*** (0,0244) 0,0873** (0,0408) -0,0072 (0,0483) 4,7688*** (1,3717)
[36-40] 0,0769*** (0,0240) 0,0580 (0,0405) -0,0456 (0,0492) 2,9738** (1,3549)
[41-45] 0,0821*** (0,0249) 0,0586 (0,0422) 0,0105 (0,0504) 3,3755** (1,3928)
[51+] -0,4192*** (0,0227) -0,0408 (0,0404) 0,0247 (0,0487) 1,8887 (1,3799)
Female -0,0098 (0,0126) 0,0199 (0,0201) 0,0679*** (0,0225) -17,5854*** (0,7338)
Couples with children 0,1057*** (0,0156) -0,0049 (0,0251) -0,0861*** (0,0291) -1,7093* (0,8859)
Couples without children 0,1023*** (0,0149) 0,0244 (0,0239) -0,0425 (0,0261) -0,6018 (0,8716)
Singles with children -0,0988*** (0,0235) 0,0677 (0,0412) -0,1706*** (0,0475) -2,6281* (1,3967)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0304 (0,0331) 0,0702 (0,0540) -0,0572 (0,0601) -4,4987** (2,1040)
General upper secondary 0,2875*** (0,0370) -0,1591*** (0,0583) 0,1386** (0,0643) -2,8131 (2,3356)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1520*** (0,0338) 0,1163** (0,0553) -0,1148* (0,0617) 0,8014 (2,1281)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2181*** (0,0440) 0,0277 (0,0708) -0,1294 (0,0841) 7,9689*** (2,6670)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2274**** (0,0410) 0,0509 (0,0675) -0,0990 (0,0793) 14,6011*** (2,5075)
Bachelor edu. 0,2164*** (0,0740) 0,1694 (0,1252) -0,1040 (0,1368) 16,7125*** (4,3106)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,2548*** (0,0462) 0,0839 (0,0758) -0,1692* (0,0927) 27,9760*** (2,8104)
Immig. western country -0,0021 (0,0348) -0,0729 (0,0558) 0,1017* (0,0616) -2,9160 (2,1239)
Immig. non-western country -0,1332*** (0,0195) -0,2262*** (0,0302) 0,0762** (0,0350) 0,5139 (1,2102)
Descendant western country 0,1116 (0,1046) -0,1227 (0,1567) 0,1631 (0,1732) 4,2494 (6,0246)
Desc. non-western country 0,0059 (0,0591) -0,1612* (0,0825) 0,0835 (0,0871) 3,6880 (3,5652)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0258 (0,0292) 0,0379 (0,0474) 0,0050 (0,0535) -1,5105 (1,7389)
Manufacturing -0,0398 (0,0304) 0,0410 (0,0515) -0,0381 (0,0580) 5,2268*** (1,7748)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0952** (0,0381) -0,0004 (0,0686) 0,0775 (0,0762) -0,3820 (2,1632)
Construction 0,0397 (0,0316) 0,0199 (0,0513) -0,0925 (0,0581) 11,5254*** (1,8503)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0748*** (0,0259) -0,0540 (0,0418) 0,0065 (0,0467) -1,6734 (1,5530)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0770** (0,0322) 0,0276 (0,0518) 0,0138 (0,0571) 6,5191*** (1,8836)
Finance and business -0,0673*** (0,0254) 0,0088 (0,0419) -0,0052 (0,0469) 1,5670 (1,5422)
Public and personal service 0,0090 (0,0258) -0,0480 (0,0429) 0,1100** (0,0478) -6,7599*** (1,5516)
Self-employed 0,0502** (0,0253) -0,6040*** (0,0369) -0,0700 (0,0464) 6,3977*** (1,6907)
Top manager 0,0444 (0,0961) 0,1939 (0,1723) -0,1398 (0,1995) 44,5148*** (5,1319)
Employees upper level 0,1080*** (0,0313) 0,0746 (0,0512) -0,0918 (0,0608) 20,3059*** (1,8725)
Employees medium level 0,0258 (0,0267) 0,0529 (0,0448) -0,1224** (0,0541) 10,0338*** (1,4914)
Employees basic level -0,0070*** (0,0129) 0,0494** (0,0209) -0,0398* (0,0227) 0,2923 (0,7595)
No work experience -0,1240*** (0,0455) -0,2186*** (0,0675) 0,1193 (0,0765) -7,7099** (3,5579)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0821*** (0,0163) 0,0572** (0,0268) -0,0333 (0,0305) 4,9337*** (0,9638)
More than 11 years 0,1751*** (0,0190) 0,1270*** (0,0321) -0,1151*** (0,0376) 7,7716*** (1,1267)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - -9,0882*** (1,4205)
Athrho -0,3864*** (0,0237) -1,4480*** (0,0085) 1,5915*** (0,0429) - -
LR test of rho=0                         Prob > chi2= 0.0000        Prob > chi2= 0.0000         Prob > chi2= 0.000
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign. at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.  
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood.
Table A4. Post-Program effects of services/sanctions programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.  
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earnings (2)
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage level
Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err.
Effects of services/sanc. 0,4439*** (0,0500) 1,3960*** (0,0217) -1,5332*** (0,0236) 12,7363*** (3,0047)
[18-25] 0,3791*** (0,0262) -0,1027** (0,0418) 0,2419*** (0,0475) -7,5728*** (1,5332)
[26-30] 0,1998*** (0,0252) 0,12054*** (0,0408) -0,0074 (0,0468) 5,0328*** (1,4342)
[31-35] 0,1473*** (0,0246) 0,0741* (0,0399) 0,0199 (0,0463) 4,8320*** (1,3692)
[36-40] 0,0748*** (0,0242) 0,0118 (0,0396) 0,0405 (0,0466) 2,8072** (1,3511)
[41-45] 0,0801*** (0,0251) 0,0183 (0,0413) 0,0655 (0,0483) 3,1277** (1,3885)
[51+] -0,4589*** (0,0228) -0,0993** (0,0397) 0,1171** (0,0468) 1,1384 (1,3779)
Female 0,012 (0,0126) 0,0205 (0,0198) 0,0617*** (0,0215) -17,1722*** (0,7344)
Couples with children 0,1623*** (0,0152) 0,1482*** (0,0244) -0,2410*** (0,0274) -0,0910 (0,8636)
Couples without children 0,1286*** (0,0149) 0,0873*** (0,0233) -0,1043*** (0,0250) 0,2939 (0,8633)
Singles with children -0,0734*** (0,0236) 0,1108*** (0,0398) -0,1988*** (0,0439) -2,1648 (1,3929)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0191 (0,0333) 0,0434 (0,0538) -0,0144 (0,0590) -4,7142** (2,0978)
General upper secondary 0,2538*** (0,0373) -0,2767*** (0,0579) 0,2808*** (0,0630) -3,8561* (2,3266)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1552*** (0,0341) 0,0922* (0,0550) -0,0773 (0,0604) 0,8687 (2,1241)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2194*** (0,0445) -0,0241 (0,0702) -0,0296 (0,0802) 8,4993*** (2,6640)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2591*** (0,0413) 0,1286* (0,0668) -0,1613** (0,0765) 16,3545*** (2,4899)
Bachelor edu. 0,2685*** (0,0751) 0,2501** (0,1214) -0,1919 (0,1325) 18,5247*** (4,2926)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,2963*** (0,0466) 0,2167*** (0,0748) -0,2726*** (0,0881) 30,0199*** (2,7892)
Immig. western country 0,0075 (0,0351) 0,0256 (0,0553) 0,0013 (0,0595) -2,6468 (2,1221)
Immig. non-western country -0,0585*** (0,0195) 0,0236 (0,0300) -0,1615*** (0,0336) 2,8340** (1,2027)
Descendant western country 0,1114 (0,1054) -0,0112 (0,1519) 0,0392 (0,1661) 5,9289 (6,0071)
Desc. non-western country -0,0021 (0,0594) -0,1227 (0,0810) 0,0665 (0,0838) 4,3086 (3,5543)
Agr., fishing, quarr. 0,0108 (0,0294) 0,1352*** (0,0465) -0,1200** (0,0512) -0,7971 (1,7348)
Manufacturing -0,0157 (0,0306) 0,1757*** (0,0504) -0,1816*** (0,0553) 5,8876*** (1,7697)
Electricity, gas and water -0,034 (0,0383) 0,2327*** (0,0663) -0,1815** (0,0716) 2,0396 (2,1442)
Construction 0,0371 (0,0319) 0,0150 (0,0502) -0,0740 (0,0551) 10,8368*** (1,8448)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0709*** (0,0261) -0,0762* (0,0408) 0,0388 (0,0444) -2,7113* (1,5495)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0813** (0,0324) 0,0115 (0,0507) 0,0237 (0,0548) 5,6127*** (1,8747)
Finance and business -0,0756*** (0,0256) -0,0106 (0,0409) 0,0139 (0,0446) 0,5497 (1,5329)
Public and personal service 0,0318 (0,0260) 0,0657 (0,0418) -0,0226 (0,0455) -6,0557*** (1,5489)
Self-employed 0,0424* (0,0255) -0,6165*** (0,0366) 0,0102 (0,0440) 6,0338*** (1,6886)
Top manager 0,0108 (0,0970) 0,0049 (0,1646) 0,1086 (0,1774) 43,4000*** (5,1298)
Employees upper level 0,0988*** (0,0320) -0,0115 (0,0500) -0,0380 (0,0588) 20,3505*** (1,8751)
Employees medium level 0,0357 (0,0269) 0,0621 (0,0433) -0,1021** (0,0440) 10,5170*** (1,4870)
Employees basic level 0,0149 (0,0129) 0,1148*** (0,0204) -0,1091*** (0,0217) 1,3986* (0,7439)
No work experience -0,1079** (0,0458) -0,1211* (0,0670) 0,0056 (0,0748) -7,9482** (3,5478)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1235*** (0,0162) 0,1857*** (0,0260) -0,1645*** (0,0286) 6,7327*** (0,9394)
More than 11 years 0,2368*** (0,0186) 0,3499*** (0,0309) -0,3523*** (0,0352) 10,5764*** (1,0881)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - -7,4075*** (1,7792)
Athrho -0,2567*** (0,0318) -1,6127*** (0,0556) 1,8214*** (0,0533) - -
LR test of rho=0                           Prob > chi2= 0.0000        Prob > chi2= 0.0000         Prob > chi2= 0.000
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood.
 Table A5. 
Multinomial logit with selection for private sector employment programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
[18-25] 0,1669*** (0,0360) -0,0287 (0,0286) 0,0639*** (0,0242) -0,1636 (3,9062)
[26-30] 0,0360 (0,0347) -0,0212 (0,0272) 0,0466** (0,0230) 2,8505 (3,674)
[31-35] -0,0003 (0,0340) -0,0367 (0,0265) 0,0366 (0,0224) 5,7053 (3,5607)
[36-40] -0,0435 (0,0335) -0,0175 (0,0264) 0,0238 (0,0223) 1,1382 (3,5677)
[41-45] 0,0599* (0,0345) -0,0086 (0,0262) 0,0144 (0,0222) 6,4695* (3,5291)
[51+] -0,0861** (0,0361) 0,0267 (0,0294) -0,0299 (0,0249) 7,3067* (3,9890)
Female 0,0405** (0,0205) -0,0318* (0,0161) 0,0311** (0,0137) -15,8155*** (2,2237)
Couples with children 0,0672*** (0,0214) -0,0091 (0,0161) -0,0004 (0,0143) -0,2098 (2,3135)
Couples without children 0,0490** (0,0214) -0,0055 (0,0170) 0,0019 (0,0144) -3,0179 (2,3349)
Singles with children -0,0043 (0,0341) 0,0268 (0,0280) -0,0267 (0,0237) 0,0889 (3,8468)
Basic school/preparatory -0,0657 (0,0453) 0,0168 (0,0347) -0,0171 (0,0294) 3,2878 (4,8331)
General upper secondary 0,0404 (0,0531) -0,0281 (0,0403) 0,0180 (0,0341) 1,8333 (5,6879)
Vocational train. edu. -0,0678 (0,0462) -0,0001 (0,0354) -0,0072 (0,0299) 2,475 (4,9185)
Short-cycle higher edu. -0,0309 (0,0614) -0,0127 (0,0471) 0,0390 (0,0398) -2,0663 (6,6010)
Med.-cycle higher edu. -0,0658 (0,0633) 0,0222 (0,0499) -0,0006 (0,0423) 7,5589 (7,0481)
Bachelor edu. -0,0563 (0,1143) -0,0647 (0,0887) 0,0892 (0,0751) 24,3257* (13,2650)
Long cycle higher edu. -0,1066 (0,0728) 0,0218 (0,0585) 0,0015 (0,0495) 12,6798 (7,9160)
Imm.western country 0,0266 (0,0481) -0,0766** (0,0380) 0,0522 (0,0322) -2,7854 (5,3037)
Immig. non-west country 0,0139 (0,0282) -0,1106*** (0,0222) 0,0755*** (0,0188) -3,5702 (3,1292)
Descendant west country 0,1345 (0,1821) 0,1794 (0,1314) -0,1460 (0,1112) -14,838 (16,4099)
Desc.non-west country 0,0173 (0,0994) -0,036 (0,0769) -0,0083 (0,0651) -7,0751 (11,7373)
Agr., fishing, quarr. 0,0599 (0,0440) -0,0608* (0,0361) 0,0326 (0,0305) -0,4021 (4,9592)
Manufacturing 0,0027 (0,0470) -0,1099*** (0,0385) 0,0739** (0,0326) -1,6497 (5,2784)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0475 (0,0540) -0,1212*** (0,0445) 0,0940** (0,0377) -3,7884 (6,0173)
Construction -0,0077 (0,0474) -0,0720* (0,0395) 0,0416 (0,0334) 1,4215 (5,4195)
Rtrade, hotel a restaurants 0,0429 (0,0468) -0,1346*** (0,0383) 0,0994*** (0,0324) -6,8135 (5,2922)
Transport, post, telecom 0,0444 (0,0492) -0,0873** (0,0400) 0,0332 (0,0338) 6,9395 (5,4201)
Finance and business 0,0185 (0,0389) -0,0057 (0,0327) -0,0194 (0,0277) 0,8670 (4,4692)
Public and personal service 0,1002** (0,0458) 0,0570 (0,0376) -0,0628** (0,0318) 6,2642 (5,1487)
Self-employed -0,1057 (0,0354) -0,0705 (0,0279) 0,0109 (0,0236) -5,0187 (3,9252)
Top manager -0,0226 (0,1459) 0,0306 (0,1116) -0,0173 (0,0945) 11,4294 (13,9413)
Employees upper level 0,0432 (0,0564) -0,0926** (0,0439) 0,0556 (0,0371) 11,7272* (6,1000)
Employees medium level -0,0540 (0,0408) -0,0762 (0,0321) 0,0587** (0,0271) 5,3697 (4,3088)
Employees basic level -0,0169 (0,0174) -0,0011 (0,0137) 0,0110 (0,0116) -3,6035* (1,9019)
No work experience -0,0446 (0,0667) -0,1203 (0,0770) -0,0997 (0,0652) -13,3026 (13,3138)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0601*** (0,0217) -0,0139 (0,0177) 0,0267* (0,0149) 2,2012 (2,4370)
More than 11 years 0,1030*** (0,0256) -0,0461** (0,0206)  0,0621*** (0,0174) 2,4830 (2,8259)
m1 -0,1576** (0,0667) -0,1499*** (0,0529) 0,1769*** (0,0448) -5,6034 (7,2297)
m2 0,5676* (0,3101) 1,0788*** (0,2515) -0,7747*** (0,2129) 119,716*** (35,4267)
m3 0,1077 (0,3017) 0,2622 (0,2449) -0,0591 (0,2074) 81,0641** (34,4748)
m4 -0,0109 (0,2012) 0,2328 (0,1629) -0,0814 (0,1379) 43,6091* (22,8357)
Table A6. Multinomial logit with selection for public sector employment programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign. at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels
Coeff. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
[18-25] 0,1661*** (0,0233) 0,0238 (0,0296) 0,0233 (0,0276) -8,9199** (3,5331)
[26-30] 0,0539** (0,0240) 0,0075 (0,0296) 0,0162 (0,0276) 3,8998 (3,5152)
[31-35] 0,0262 (0,0241) -0,0164 (0,0294) 0,0432 (0,0274) 6,8981** (3,4518)
[36-40] 0,0247 (0,0236) -0,0393 (0,0287) 0,0556** (0,0267) 4,1376 (3,3486)
[41-45] 0,0177 (0,0239) -0,0167 (0,0290) 0,0219 (0,0270) 1,5442 (3,3769)
[51+] -0,1638*** (0,0221) 0,0781*** (0,0290) -0,0618** (0,0270) 6,2402* (3,3960)
Female 0,0262** (0,0127) -0,0108 (0,0156) 0,0348** (0,0146) -15,4157*** (1,9013)
Couples with children 0,0268* (0,0141) 0,00008 (0,0174) -0,0226 (0,0162) -1,9559 (2,0560)
Couples without children 0,0205 (0,0133) -0,0143 (0,0163) 0,0038 (0,0152) -5,2300*** (1,9668)
Singles with children -0,0453** (0,0198) 0,0592** (0,0256) -0,0639*** (0,0238) -5,1914* (2,9727)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0553* (0,0287) 0,1107*** (0,0404) -0,0848** (0,0377) -6,5344 (5,2786)
General upper secondary 0,1848*** (0,0322) 0,0132 (0,0435) 0,0075 (0,0406) -13,6006** (5,7235)
Vocational train.edu. 0,0958*** (0,0298) 0,0811* (0,0415) -0,0533 (0,0387) -3,0500 (5,3793)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0878* (0,0454) 0,0577 (0,0579) -0,0509 (0,0540) 0,2272 (7,1626)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,1056** (0,0409) 0,0909* (0,0536) -0,0332 (0,0500) 7,6085 (6,6866)
Bachelor edu. 0,1873** (0,0928) 0,0107 (0,1019) 0,0486 (0,0950) 0,7905 (13,0829)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,1056** (0,0521) 0,0944 (0,0653) -0,0319 (0,0609) 24,0475*** (7,9994)
Immig. western country -0,0020 (0,0033) -0,0171 (0,0430) -0,0010 (0,0401) -3,6289 (5,2052)
Immig. non-western country -0,0289 (0,0198) -0,1031*** (0,0247) 0,0372 (0,0230) -3,7911 (3,1259)
Descendant western country -0,0400 (0,0928) 0,0500 (0,1223) 0,0316 (0,1141) -3,2529 (13,2398)
Desc. non-western country -0,1127** (0,0555) -0,0615 (0,0736) 0,0077 (0,0686) 2,9952 (9,1736)
Agriculture, fishing, quarr. 0,0544** (0,0259) -0,1115*** (0,0330) 0,1035*** (0,0307) -2,3399 (4,0219)
Manufacturing 0,0006 (0,0294) -0,1125*** (0,0376) 0,1027*** (0,0351) 3,2725 (4,4897)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0661* (0,0368) -0,1348*** (0,0482) 0,1327*** (0,0449) 4,4301 (5,6318)
Construction 0,0252 (0,0288) -0,0592 (0,0373) 0,0518 (0,0348) 6,183 (4,4137)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0244 (0,0279) -0,1745*** (0,0356) 0,1552*** (0,0332) -5,6884 (4,3380)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0811*** (0,0308) -0,1429*** (0,0382) 0,1322*** (0,0356) 2,2708 (4,6162)
Finance and business 0,0132 (0,0208) -0,0345 (0,0283) 0,0248 (0,0263) 3,2452 (3,3815)
Public and personal service 0,0633*** (0,0228) -0,0159 (0,0306) 0,0035 (0,0283) 2,6531 (3,6211)
Self-employed -0,0011 (0,0241) -0,2501*** (0,0295) 0,0233 (0,0275) 8,2841* (4,3006)
Top manager 0,1144 (0,1241) -0,0738 (0,1286) 0,0936 (0,1199) 3,4404 (14,0006)
Employees upper level -0,001 (0,0402) -0,1131** (0,0460) 0,0250 (0,0429) 2,2859 (5,5480)
Employees medium level -0,0022 (0,0309) -0,0178 (0,0368) -0,0111 (0,0343) 2,3203 (4,2135)
Employees basic level -0,0074 (0,0103) 0,0120 (0,0127) -0,0174 (0,0119) -2,0683 (1,5441)
No work experience -0,0081 (0,0394) -0,0054 (0,0488) 0,0596 (0,0455) -3,4198 (7,3533)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0535*** (0,0146) 0,0324* (0,0185) -0,0193 (0,0173) 4,4533** (2,2519)
More than 11 years 0,0662*** (0,0175) 0,0462** (0,0226)  -0,0112 (0,0211) 3,9096 (2,7181)
m1 -0,1864 (0,1710) -0,8546*** (0,2054) 0,7831*** (0,1915) -56,1796** (24,5607)
m2 0,2650*** (0,0524) 0,1520** (0,0627) -0,1748*** (0,0585) 6,9423 (7,7222)
m3 0,2526** (0,1190) -0,5724*** (0,1441) 0,3975*** (0,1343) -6,8302 (17,6018)
m4 0,2948*** (0,0811) -0,2452** (0,0959) 0,1489 (0,0894) -9,1349 (11,9364)
Table A7. Multinomial logit with selection for education/training programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
[18-25] 0,1088*** (0,0191) 0,0313** (0,0147) 0,0071 (0,0095) 1,8929 (2,8007)
[26-30] 0,0251 (0,0164) 0,0060 (0,0125) 0,0167** (0,0081) 4,2708* (2,3659)
[31-35] 0,0253 (0,0157) -0,0014 (0,0118) 0,0122 (0,0077) 2,0739 (2,2363)
[36-40] -0,0075 (0,0152) -0,0112 (0,0114) 0,0158** (0,0074) 2,7391 (2,1621)
[41-45] 0,0065 (0,0152) 0,0027 (0,0114) 0,0079 (0,0074) 4,1712* (2,1430)
[51+] -0,1379*** (0,0155) 0,0217* (0,0123) -0,0166 (0,0080) 3,816 (2,3766)
Female -0,0065 (0,0098) 0,0218*** (0,0076) 0,0043 (0,0050) -19,9087*** (1,4555)
Couples with children 0,0476*** (0,0102) -0,0195** (0,0079) 0,0052 (0,0051) -2,3446 (1,4949)
Couples without children 0,0230** (0,0104) -0,0190** (0,0083) 0,0103* (0,0054) -0,8866 (1,5792)
Singles with children -0,0327** (0,0152) -0,0207* (0,0123) -0,0053 (0,0080) -4,8621** (2,3198)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0247 (0,0220) 0,0317* (0,0187) -0,0100 (0,0122) -3,9141 (3,6246)
General upper secondary 0,0453* (0,0258) -0,0263 (0,0215) 0,0397*** (0,0149) 0,2588 (4,2277)
Vocational train. edu. 0,0493** (0,0224) 0,0141 (0,0189) -0,0008 (0,0123) 1,4063 (3,6661)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0700** (0,0281) -0,0143 (0,0229) 0,0123 (0,0149 7,3393* (4,4306)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,1008*** (0,0260) 0,0963 (0,0212) 0,0047 (0,0138) 15,6679*** (4,1033)
Bachelor edu. 0,0489 (0,0457) 0,0316 (0,0357) 0,0126 (0,0232) 20,3571*** (6,9156)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,1199*** (0,0290) 0,0029 (0,0232) 0,0114 (0,0150) 32,8998*** (4,5663)
Immig. western country -0,0198 (0,0231) -0,0423** (0,0183) 0,0401*** (0,0119) -13,0934*** (3,6503)
Immig. non-western country -0,0653*** (0,0137) -0,1036*** (0,0111) 0,0309*** (0,0072) 1,8524 (2,1748)
Descendant western country 0,1550** (0,0725) 0,0395 (0,0491) -0,0155 (0,0320) 18,9305* (9,6679)
Desc. non-western country 0,0525 (0,0512) -0,1259*** (0,0371) 0,0885*** (0,0241) 5,8481 (7,3373)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0558*** (0,0204) -0,0004 (0,0160) 0,0111 (0,0104) -1,5317 (3,0704)
Manufacturing -0,0473** (0,0224) -0,0151 (0,0174) 0,0197* (0,0113) 5,7075* (3,2943)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0354 (0,0252) -0,0184 (0,0194) 0,0266** (0,0126) -0,1660 (3,5622)
Construction -0,0214 (0,0221) -0,0538*** (0,0187) 0,0362*** (0,0121) 15,0392*** (3,5419)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants -0,0447** (0,0221) -0,0593*** (0,0172) 0,0319*** (0,0112) -4,1844 (3,3233)
Transport, post and telecom -0,0546** (0,0238) -0,0396** (0,0187) 0,0458*** (0,0121) 2,8968 (3,5719)
Finance and business -0,0570*** (0,0172) -0,0003 (0,0136) -0,0030 (0,0088) 0,2629 (2,6200)
Public and personal service 0,0465** (0,0180) 0,0137 (0,0139) -0,0036 (0,0091) -5,6043 (2,6993)
Self-employed 0,0355** (0,0172) -0,2980*** (0,0137) -0,0058 (0,0089) 3,6957 (3,0301)
Top manager 0,0018 (0,0589) 0,0160 (0,0441) -0,0067 (0,0287) 54,8616*** (8,1702)
Employees upper level 0,0296 (0,0201) -0,0092 (0,0150) 0,0068 (0,0098) 26,4278*** (3,0177)
Employees medium level 0,0032 (0,0173) -0,0210 (0,0132) 0,0174** (0,0086) 10,7030*** (2,5018)
Employees basic level 0,0025 (0,0090) 0,0047 (0,0071) 0,0015 (0,0046) 1,0187 (1,3426)
No work experience -0,0084 (0,0338) -0,1569*** (0,0292) -0,0157 (0,0190) 0,4994 (7,3859)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0377*** (0,0104) 0,0076 (0,0082) -0,0020 (0,0053) 6,3196*** (1,5750)
More than 11 years 0,0768*** (0,0123) 0,0131 (0,0097)  -0,0013 (0,0063) 10,3190*** (1,8582)
m1 -0,4408*** (0,1362) -0,4652*** (0,1041) 0,4217*** (0,0677) -22,8460 (19,6813)
m2 0,3730*** (0,1394) 0,0783 (0,1107) 0,0397 (0,0720) -3,9506 (21,2973)
m3 0,0620 (0,0583) -0,3223*** (0,0469) 0,3125*** (0,0305) -14,4426 (9,0789)
m4 0,1017 (0,0867) -0,3545*** (0,0686) 0,3858*** (0,0446) -18,2823 (13,1576)
Table A8. Multinomial logit with selection for services/sanctions programs
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01)
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate Extent of workig time Individual earning
 Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
[18-25] 0,1417*** (0,0244) 0,0077 (0,0230) 0,0428** (0,0167) -5,3246 (3,8161)
[26-30] 0,0404* (0,0218) 0,0074 (0,0204) 0,0093 (0,0148) 2,2436 (3,3701)
[31-35] 0,0335 (0,0210) 0,0089 (0,0195) 0,0089 (0,0142) 1,0010 (3,2149)
[36-40] 0,0165 (0,0204) 0,0012 (0,0190) -0,0027 (0,0138) 0,6430 (3,1335)
[41-45] 0,0288 (0,0205) 0,0126 (0,0190) 0,0088 (0,0138) -0,0953 (3,1093)
[51+] -0,1691*** (0,0192) 0,0415** (0,0191) -0,0491*** (0,0139) 1,3207 (3,2187)
Female 0,0390*** (0,0120) 0,0201* (0,0117) 0,0019 (0,0085) -15,9837*** (1,9770)
Couples with children 0,0716*** (0,0134) -0,0188 (0,0127) 0,0016 (0,0092) -2,245 (2,0942)
Couples without children 0,0479*** (0,0127) -0,0232* (0,0124) 0,0105 (0,0090) -0,8303 (2,0840)
Singles with children -0,0058 (0,0203) 0,0192 (0,0196) -0,0303** (0,0143) 0,9350 (3,2218)
Basic school/preparatory -0,0141 (0,0321) 0,0595* (0,0324) -0,0735*** (0,0236) -1,0912 (5,4707)
General upper secondary 0,0628* (0,0356) -0,0393 (0,0354) 0,0085 (0,0257) 4,6252 (6,0852)
Vocational train. edu. 0,0329 (0,0328) 0,0380 (0,0331) -0,0532** (0,0240) -1,4825 (5,5499)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0675* (0,0386) 0,0187 (0,0382) -0,0376 (0,0277) 10,0751 (6,4311)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,0690* (0,0369) 0,0170 (0,0366) -0,0516* (0,0266) 18,3002*** (6,2083)
Bachelor edu. 0,0592 (0,0631) 0,0112 (0,0582) -0,0014 (0,0423) 18,1795* (10,0884)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,0723* (0,0396) 0,0292 (0,0388) -0,0559** (0,0282) 25,2783*** (6,6485)
Immig. western country -0,0662** (0,0288) -0,0471 (0,0299) 0,0575*** (0,0217) 3,0959 (5,1518)
Immig. non-western country -0,0380* (0,0194) -0,1288*** (0,0187) 0,0562*** (0,0136) -2,1459 (3,2946)
Descendant western country -0,0267 (0,0867) 0,0687 (0,0813) -0,0422 (0,0591) -8,3820 (14,9796)
Desc. non-western country -0,0374 (0,0522) -0,1424*** (0,0479) 0,1540*** (0,0348) -10,3627 (8,6617)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0228 (0,0262) -0,0099 (0,0249) 0,0452** (0,0181) -4,7716 (4,2536)
Manufacturing -0,0891*** (0,0275) -0,0346 (0,0270) 0,0609*** (0,0196) -1,0879 (4,5001)
Electricity, gas and water -0,0477 (0,0341) -0,0329 (0,0329) 0,0555** (0,0239) -8,8757* (5,2788)
Construction -0,0068 (0,0287) -0,0599** (0,0271) 0,0363* (0,0197) 6,1300 (4,5497)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants -0,0016 (0,0261) -0,0654 (0,0246) 0,0674*** (0,0179) -11,0798*** (4,2604)
Transport, post and telecom -0,0237 (0,0285) -0,0563** (0,0274) 0,0845*** (0,0199) -0,8046 (4,6204)
Finance and business -0,0552*** (0,0208) 0,0115 (0,0200) 0,0163 (0,0145) 0,5351 (3,4993)
Public and personal service 0,0015 (0,0221) 0,0542** (0,0211) -0,0163 (0,0153) -6,9907* (3,7261)
Self-employed 0,0430* (0,0219) -0,2811*** (0,0208) -0,0070 (0,0151) 3,1522 (3,9142)
Top manager 0,0483 (0,0646) 0,0594 (0,0617) -0,0207 (0,0449) 36,0830*** (9,6172)
Employees upper level 0,0426* (0,0247) -0,2103 (0,0231) 0,0522*** (0,0168) 1,8802 (4,1893)
Employees medium level -0,0068 (0,0216) -0,0296 (0,0206) 0,0210 (0,0150) 1,4688 (3,4207)
Employees basic level -0,0091 (0,0115) 0,0097 (0,0111) -0,0052 (0,0080) 1,6992 (1,8358)
No work experience -0,0676 (0,0444) -0,0224 (0,0462) 0,0160 (0,0336) -16,6530* (8,7493)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0173 (0,0136) 0,0220* (0,0129) -0,0019 (0,0093) 4,4861** (2,1513)
More than 11 years 0,0297* (0,0155) 0,0066 (0,0151)  0,0165 (0,0109) 7,1671*** (2,5187)
m1 -0,4643*** (0,1711) -0,8133*** (0,1600) 0,6853*** (0,1163) 17,6112 (26,5145)
m2 -0,0960 (0,1738) 0,1514 (0,1712) -0,2372* (0,1245) 95,5652*** (28,4773)
m3 -0,1960 (0,1764) -0,6883*** (0,1751) 0,5332*** (0,1273) 60,6412** (29,0914)
m4 -0,0868* (0,0477) -0,1515*** (0,0465) 0,1345*** (0,0338) 8,9383 (7,6556)
Table A9. Labour market integration
Job finding rate: p(A) p(B|A) p(A∩B)
Private sector employment 61,3% 80,2% 4916,26 /1000
Private job training 57,2% 76,9% 4398,68/1000
Adult Apprenticeship support 77% 90% 6930/1000
Labour trainee 57,6% 76% 4377,6/1000
Public sector employment 30,7% 69,9% 2145,93/1000
Public job training 35,3% 70,4% 2485,12/1000
Individual job training 28,4% 69,3% 1968,12/1000
Pool jobs 17,6% 100% 1760/1000
Service jobs 44,2% 80,1% 3540,42/1000
Voluntary not paid activities 21,5% 67,9% 1459,85/1000
Education and training 39,5% 75,7% 2990,15/1000
Education with training allowance 43,1% 75,9% 3271,29/1000
Adult education subsidies 62,7% 94,4% 5918,88/1000
Specially adapted education 20,7% 70,6% 1461,42/1000
Adult and further education 35,9% 83% 2979,7/1000
Services and sanctions 39,9% 72,6% 2896,74/1000
Intensive job seeking 41,8% 72,9% 3047,22/1000
Advisory activation 37,9% 72,2% 2736,38/1000
In a first experience Et, let A be the event that beneficiaries find a job one year latter t+1 (n% of 
full strentgh) with p(A) the prior probability of the event A (with Abar, the opposite event of A, p 
(Abar)=1-p(A)). To model the second experience Et+2, let B be the event that beneficiaries transit 
to work at time t+2 with  p(B), the probability of event or evidence  B. For all event  B, we call 
P(B|A) the  conditional  probability  that  activation  schemes  beneficiaries  at  baseline  stay  in 
employment  in  t+2,  given  that  they  successfully  managed  to  find  a  job  one  year  after 
participating into one of the selected schemes t+1. In other words, P(B|A) is the likelihood that 
evidence B was produced, given that the model was A. With A1, A2,...An  a partition of Ω, for all B 
event we have: p(A∩B) = p(A)*p(B|A) which refers to the total probability of  finding a job one 
year after and staying at work in t+2.
Table A10. Differences-in-differences estimates: employment rates 
Before After Evolution Rel. evolution 
(n-1):  
YiBe
(n+1):
YiAf
(first difference): 
∆Yi
(sec. diff.): 
βddd
Participants to private sector emp. 26% 61,3% 35,3 29,1
Participants to other programs 28% 34,2% 6,2
Participants to public sector emp. 22,8% 30,7% 7,9          -1
Participants to other programs 29,5% 38,4% 8,9
Participants to Education and training 30,6% 39,5% 8,9 0,4
Participants to other programs 26,5% 35% 8,5
Participants to services and sanctions 39,9% 43,2% 3,3 0,4
Participants to other programs 35,8% 38,7% 2,9
YiBe:  employment  rate  for  participants  before  activation.  YiAf: employment  rate  for  participants  after 
activation. Let’s notice that that participants to other programs form the “control group”.  ∆Yi  = YiAf - YiBe:  
Change within the activation experience.  βddd = (ŷ (participants to a specific type of programs, Af - (participants to a specific type  
program, Be) - ŷ (participants to other programs, Af - (participants to other programs, Be).
 
